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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c54
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19e8f2779
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
+
+struct tpmrm_priv {
+ struct file_priv priv;
+ struct tpm_space space;
+};
+
+static int tpmrm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv;
+ int rc;
+
+ chip = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdevs);
+ priv = kzalloc_obj(*priv);
+ if (priv == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = tpm2_init_space(&priv->space, TPM2_SPACE_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(priv);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tpm_common_open(file, chip, &priv->priv, &priv->space);
+
+ return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
+}
+
+static int tpmrm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_priv *fpriv = file->private_data;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv);
+
+ tpm_common_release(file, fpriv);
+ tpm2_del_space(fpriv->chip, &priv->space);
+ kfree(priv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = tpmrm_open,
+ .read = tpm_common_read,
+ .write = tpm_common_write,
+ .poll = tpm_common_poll,
+ .release = tpmrm_release,
+};