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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c54
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19e8f2779
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
+
+struct tpmrm_priv {
+ struct file_priv priv;
+ struct tpm_space space;
+};
+
+static int tpmrm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv;
+ int rc;
+
+ chip = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdevs);
+ priv = kzalloc_obj(*priv);
+ if (priv == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = tpm2_init_space(&priv->space, TPM2_SPACE_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(priv);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tpm_common_open(file, chip, &priv->priv, &priv->space);
+
+ return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
+}
+
+static int tpmrm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_priv *fpriv = file->private_data;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv);
+
+ tpm_common_release(file, fpriv);
+ tpm2_del_space(fpriv->chip, &priv->space);
+ kfree(priv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = tpmrm_open,
+ .read = tpm_common_read,
+ .write = tpm_common_write,
+ .poll = tpm_common_poll,
+ .release = tpmrm_release,
+};