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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 54 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..19e8f2779 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2017 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + */ +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "tpm-dev.h" + +struct tpmrm_priv { + struct file_priv priv; + struct tpm_space space; +}; + +static int tpmrm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip; + struct tpmrm_priv *priv; + int rc; + + chip = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdevs); + priv = kzalloc_obj(*priv); + if (priv == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = tpm2_init_space(&priv->space, TPM2_SPACE_BUFFER_SIZE); + if (rc) { + kfree(priv); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + tpm_common_open(file, chip, &priv->priv, &priv->space); + + return nonseekable_open(inode, file); +} + +static int tpmrm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct file_priv *fpriv = file->private_data; + struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv); + + tpm_common_release(file, fpriv); + tpm2_del_space(fpriv->chip, &priv->space); + kfree(priv); + + return 0; +} + +const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = tpmrm_open, + .read = tpm_common_read, + .write = tpm_common_write, + .poll = tpm_common_poll, + .release = tpmrm_release, +}; |
