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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 33 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f3742bcc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _TPM_DEV_H +#define _TPM_DEV_H + +#include <linux/poll.h> +#include "tpm.h" + +struct file_priv { + struct tpm_chip *chip; + struct tpm_space *space; + + struct mutex buffer_mutex; + struct timer_list user_read_timer; /* user needs to claim result */ + struct work_struct timeout_work; + struct work_struct async_work; + wait_queue_head_t async_wait; + ssize_t response_length; + bool response_read; + bool command_enqueued; + + u8 data_buffer[TPM_BUFSIZE]; +}; + +void tpm_common_open(struct file *file, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct file_priv *priv, struct tpm_space *space); +ssize_t tpm_common_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *off); +ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *off); +__poll_t tpm_common_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); + +void tpm_common_release(struct file *file, struct file_priv *priv); +#endif |
