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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h33
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f3742bcc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _TPM_DEV_H
+#define _TPM_DEV_H
+
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+struct file_priv {
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ struct tpm_space *space;
+
+ struct mutex buffer_mutex;
+ struct timer_list user_read_timer; /* user needs to claim result */
+ struct work_struct timeout_work;
+ struct work_struct async_work;
+ wait_queue_head_t async_wait;
+ ssize_t response_length;
+ bool response_read;
+ bool command_enqueued;
+
+ u8 data_buffer[TPM_BUFSIZE];
+};
+
+void tpm_common_open(struct file *file, struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct file_priv *priv, struct tpm_space *space);
+ssize_t tpm_common_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off);
+ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off);
+__poll_t tpm_common_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+
+void tpm_common_release(struct file *file, struct file_priv *priv);
+#endif