staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 67 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..74488f0a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
+ * Authors:
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Dave Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Obsidian Research Corp
+ * Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
+ *
+ * Device file system interface to the TPM
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
+
+static int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+	struct file_priv *priv;
+
+	chip = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdev);
+
+	/* It's assured that the chip will be opened just once,
+	 * by the check of is_open variable, which is protected
+	 * by driver_lock. */
+	if (test_and_set_bit(0, &chip->is_open)) {
+		dev_dbg(&chip->dev, "Another process owns this TPM\n");
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	priv = kzalloc_obj(*priv);
+	if (priv == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	tpm_common_open(file, chip, priv, NULL);
+
+	return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
+
+ out:
+	clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called on file close
+ */
+static int tpm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
+
+	tpm_common_release(file, priv);
+	clear_bit(0, &priv->chip->is_open);
+	kfree(priv);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const struct file_operations tpm_fops = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.open = tpm_open,
+	.read = tpm_common_read,
+	.write = tpm_common_write,
+	.poll = tpm_common_poll,
+	.release = tpm_release,
+};