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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/cdx/controller/mcdid.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/cdx/controller/mcdid.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/cdx/controller/mcdid.h | 63 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/cdx/controller/mcdid.h b/drivers/cdx/controller/mcdid.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7fc29f099 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/cdx/controller/mcdid.h @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + * + * Copyright 2008-2013 Solarflare Communications Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2022-2025, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + */ + +#ifndef CDX_MCDID_H +#define CDX_MCDID_H + +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> +#include <linux/rpmsg.h> + +#include "mc_cdx_pcol.h" + +#ifdef DEBUG +#define CDX_WARN_ON_ONCE_PARANOID(x) WARN_ON_ONCE(x) +#define CDX_WARN_ON_PARANOID(x) WARN_ON(x) +#else +#define CDX_WARN_ON_ONCE_PARANOID(x) do {} while (0) +#define CDX_WARN_ON_PARANOID(x) do {} while (0) +#endif + +#define MCDI_BUF_LEN (8 + MCDI_CTL_SDU_LEN_MAX) + +static inline struct cdx_mcdi_iface *cdx_mcdi_if(struct cdx_mcdi *cdx) +{ + return cdx->mcdi ? &cdx->mcdi->iface : NULL; +} + +int cdx_mcdi_rpc_async(struct cdx_mcdi *cdx, unsigned int cmd, + const struct cdx_dword *inbuf, size_t inlen, + cdx_mcdi_async_completer *complete, + unsigned long cookie); +int cdx_mcdi_wait_for_quiescence(struct cdx_mcdi *cdx, + unsigned int timeout_jiffies); + +/* + * We expect that 16- and 32-bit fields in MCDI requests and responses + * are appropriately aligned, but 64-bit fields are only + * 32-bit-aligned. + */ +#define MCDI_BYTE(_buf, _field) \ + ((void)BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(MC_CMD_ ## _field ## _LEN != 1), \ + *MCDI_PTR(_buf, _field)) +#define MCDI_WORD(_buf, _field) \ + ((void)BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(MC_CMD_ ## _field ## _LEN != 2), \ + le16_to_cpu(*(__force const __le16 *)MCDI_PTR(_buf, _field))) +#define MCDI_POPULATE_DWORD_1(_buf, _field, _name1, _value1) \ + CDX_POPULATE_DWORD_1(*_MCDI_DWORD(_buf, _field), \ + MC_CMD_ ## _name1, _value1) +#define MCDI_SET_QWORD(_buf, _field, _value) \ + do { \ + CDX_POPULATE_DWORD_1(_MCDI_DWORD(_buf, _field)[0], \ + CDX_DWORD, (u32)(_value)); \ + CDX_POPULATE_DWORD_1(_MCDI_DWORD(_buf, _field)[1], \ + CDX_DWORD, (u64)(_value) >> 32); \ + } while (0) +#define MCDI_QWORD(_buf, _field) \ + (CDX_DWORD_FIELD(_MCDI_DWORD(_buf, _field)[0], CDX_DWORD) | \ + (u64)CDX_DWORD_FIELD(_MCDI_DWORD(_buf, _field)[1], CDX_DWORD) << 32) + +#endif /* CDX_MCDID_H */ |
