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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/base/regmap/regmap-ram.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/base/regmap/regmap-ram.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/base/regmap/regmap-ram.c | 91 |
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-ram.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-ram.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c7356b0d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-ram.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// +// Register map access API - Memory region +// +// This is intended for testing only +// +// Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Ltd + +#include <linux/clk.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/regmap.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/swab.h> + +#include "internal.h" + +static int regmap_ram_write(void *context, unsigned int reg, unsigned int val) +{ + struct regmap_ram_data *data = context; + + data->vals[reg] = val; + data->written[reg] = true; + + return 0; +} + +static int regmap_ram_read(void *context, unsigned int reg, unsigned int *val) +{ + struct regmap_ram_data *data = context; + + *val = data->vals[reg]; + data->read[reg] = true; + + return 0; +} + +static void regmap_ram_free_context(void *context) +{ + struct regmap_ram_data *data = context; + + kfree(data->vals); + kfree(data->read); + kfree(data->written); + kfree(data); +} + +static const struct regmap_bus regmap_ram = { + .fast_io = true, + .reg_write = regmap_ram_write, + .reg_read = regmap_ram_read, + .free_context = regmap_ram_free_context, +}; + +struct regmap *__regmap_init_ram(struct device *dev, + const struct regmap_config *config, + struct regmap_ram_data *data, + struct lock_class_key *lock_key, + const char *lock_name) +{ + struct regmap *map; + + if (!config->max_register) { + pr_crit("No max_register specified for RAM regmap\n"); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + + data->read = kzalloc_objs(bool, config->max_register + 1); + if (!data->read) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + data->written = kzalloc_objs(bool, config->max_register + 1); + if (!data->written) { + kfree(data->read); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } + + map = __regmap_init(dev, ®map_ram, data, config, + lock_key, lock_name); + if (IS_ERR(map)) { + kfree(data->read); + kfree(data->written); + } + + return map; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__regmap_init_ram); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Register map access API - Memory region"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); |
