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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /drivers/android/binder/stats.rs
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
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x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/android/binder/stats.rs')
-rw-r--r--drivers/android/binder/stats.rs89
1 files changed, 89 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/stats.rs b/drivers/android/binder/stats.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ec81dc774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/android/binder/stats.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+// Copyright (C) 2025 Google LLC.
+
+//! Keep track of statistics for binder_logs.
+
+use crate::defs::*;
+use kernel::sync::atomic::{ordering::Relaxed, Atomic};
+use kernel::{ioctl::_IOC_NR, seq_file::SeqFile, seq_print};
+
+const BC_COUNT: usize = _IOC_NR(BC_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION_DONE) as usize + 1;
+const BR_COUNT: usize = _IOC_NR(BR_CLEAR_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION_DONE) as usize + 1;
+
+pub(crate) static GLOBAL_STATS: BinderStats = BinderStats::new();
+
+pub(crate) struct BinderStats {
+ bc: [Atomic<u32>; BC_COUNT],
+ br: [Atomic<u32>; BR_COUNT],
+}
+
+impl BinderStats {
+ pub(crate) const fn new() -> Self {
+ #[expect(clippy::declare_interior_mutable_const)]
+ const ZERO: Atomic<u32> = Atomic::new(0);
+
+ Self {
+ bc: [ZERO; BC_COUNT],
+ br: [ZERO; BR_COUNT],
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn inc_bc(&self, bc: u32) {
+ let idx = _IOC_NR(bc) as usize;
+ if let Some(bc_ref) = self.bc.get(idx) {
+ bc_ref.fetch_add(1, Relaxed);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn inc_br(&self, br: u32) {
+ let idx = _IOC_NR(br) as usize;
+ if let Some(br_ref) = self.br.get(idx) {
+ br_ref.fetch_add(1, Relaxed);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn debug_print(&self, prefix: &str, m: &SeqFile) {
+ for (i, cnt) in self.bc.iter().enumerate() {
+ let cnt = cnt.load(Relaxed);
+ if cnt > 0 {
+ seq_print!(m, "{}{}: {}\n", prefix, command_string(i), cnt);
+ }
+ }
+ for (i, cnt) in self.br.iter().enumerate() {
+ let cnt = cnt.load(Relaxed);
+ if cnt > 0 {
+ seq_print!(m, "{}{}: {}\n", prefix, return_string(i), cnt);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+mod strings {
+ use core::str::from_utf8_unchecked;
+ use kernel::str::{CStr, CStrExt as _};
+
+ extern "C" {
+ static binder_command_strings: [*const u8; super::BC_COUNT];
+ static binder_return_strings: [*const u8; super::BR_COUNT];
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn command_string(i: usize) -> &'static str {
+ // SAFETY: Accessing `binder_command_strings` is always safe.
+ let c_str_ptr = unsafe { binder_command_strings[i] };
+ // SAFETY: The `binder_command_strings` array only contains nul-terminated strings.
+ let bytes = unsafe { CStr::from_char_ptr(c_str_ptr) }.to_bytes();
+ // SAFETY: The `binder_command_strings` array only contains strings with ascii-chars.
+ unsafe { from_utf8_unchecked(bytes) }
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn return_string(i: usize) -> &'static str {
+ // SAFETY: Accessing `binder_return_strings` is always safe.
+ let c_str_ptr = unsafe { binder_return_strings[i] };
+ // SAFETY: The `binder_command_strings` array only contains nul-terminated strings.
+ let bytes = unsafe { CStr::from_char_ptr(c_str_ptr) }.to_bytes();
+ // SAFETY: The `binder_command_strings` array only contains strings with ascii-chars.
+ unsafe { from_utf8_unchecked(bytes) }
+ }
+}
+use strings::{command_string, return_string};