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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/android/binder/node
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/android/binder/node')
-rw-r--r--drivers/android/binder/node/wrapper.rs78
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/node/wrapper.rs b/drivers/android/binder/node/wrapper.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e4ca01c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/android/binder/node/wrapper.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+// Copyright (C) 2025 Google LLC.
+
+use kernel::{list::ListArc, prelude::*, seq_file::SeqFile, seq_print, sync::UniqueArc};
+
+use crate::{node::Node, thread::Thread, BinderReturnWriter, DArc, DLArc, DTRWrap, DeliverToRead};
+
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+pub(crate) struct CritIncrWrapper {
+ inner: UniqueArc<MaybeUninit<DTRWrap<NodeWrapper>>>,
+}
+
+impl CritIncrWrapper {
+ pub(crate) fn new() -> Result<Self> {
+ Ok(CritIncrWrapper {
+ inner: UniqueArc::new_uninit(GFP_KERNEL)?,
+ })
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn init(self, node: DArc<Node>) -> DLArc<dyn DeliverToRead> {
+ match self.inner.pin_init_with(DTRWrap::new(NodeWrapper { node })) {
+ Ok(initialized) => ListArc::from(initialized) as DLArc<dyn DeliverToRead>,
+ Err(err) => match err {},
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct NodeWrapper {
+ node: DArc<Node>,
+}
+
+kernel::list::impl_list_arc_safe! {
+ impl ListArcSafe<0> for NodeWrapper {
+ untracked;
+ }
+}
+
+impl DeliverToRead for NodeWrapper {
+ fn do_work(
+ self: DArc<Self>,
+ _thread: &Thread,
+ writer: &mut BinderReturnWriter<'_>,
+ ) -> Result<bool> {
+ let node = &self.node;
+ let mut owner_inner = node.owner.inner.lock();
+ let inner = node.inner.access_mut(&mut owner_inner);
+
+ let ds = &mut inner.delivery_state;
+
+ assert!(ds.has_pushed_wrapper);
+ assert!(ds.has_strong_zero2one);
+ ds.has_pushed_wrapper = false;
+ ds.has_strong_zero2one = false;
+
+ node.do_work_locked(writer, owner_inner)
+ }
+
+ fn cancel(self: DArc<Self>) {}
+
+ fn should_sync_wakeup(&self) -> bool {
+ false
+ }
+
+ #[inline(never)]
+ fn debug_print(&self, m: &SeqFile, prefix: &str, _tprefix: &str) -> Result<()> {
+ seq_print!(
+ m,
+ "{}node work {}: u{:016x} c{:016x}\n",
+ prefix,
+ self.node.debug_id,
+ self.node.ptr,
+ self.node.cookie,
+ );
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}