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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/android/binder/node | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/android/binder/node')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/android/binder/node/wrapper.rs | 78 |
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/node/wrapper.rs b/drivers/android/binder/node/wrapper.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6e4ca01c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/android/binder/node/wrapper.rs @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +// Copyright (C) 2025 Google LLC. + +use kernel::{list::ListArc, prelude::*, seq_file::SeqFile, seq_print, sync::UniqueArc}; + +use crate::{node::Node, thread::Thread, BinderReturnWriter, DArc, DLArc, DTRWrap, DeliverToRead}; + +use core::mem::MaybeUninit; + +pub(crate) struct CritIncrWrapper { + inner: UniqueArc<MaybeUninit<DTRWrap<NodeWrapper>>>, +} + +impl CritIncrWrapper { + pub(crate) fn new() -> Result<Self> { + Ok(CritIncrWrapper { + inner: UniqueArc::new_uninit(GFP_KERNEL)?, + }) + } + + pub(super) fn init(self, node: DArc<Node>) -> DLArc<dyn DeliverToRead> { + match self.inner.pin_init_with(DTRWrap::new(NodeWrapper { node })) { + Ok(initialized) => ListArc::from(initialized) as DLArc<dyn DeliverToRead>, + Err(err) => match err {}, + } + } +} + +struct NodeWrapper { + node: DArc<Node>, +} + +kernel::list::impl_list_arc_safe! { + impl ListArcSafe<0> for NodeWrapper { + untracked; + } +} + +impl DeliverToRead for NodeWrapper { + fn do_work( + self: DArc<Self>, + _thread: &Thread, + writer: &mut BinderReturnWriter<'_>, + ) -> Result<bool> { + let node = &self.node; + let mut owner_inner = node.owner.inner.lock(); + let inner = node.inner.access_mut(&mut owner_inner); + + let ds = &mut inner.delivery_state; + + assert!(ds.has_pushed_wrapper); + assert!(ds.has_strong_zero2one); + ds.has_pushed_wrapper = false; + ds.has_strong_zero2one = false; + + node.do_work_locked(writer, owner_inner) + } + + fn cancel(self: DArc<Self>) {} + + fn should_sync_wakeup(&self) -> bool { + false + } + + #[inline(never)] + fn debug_print(&self, m: &SeqFile, prefix: &str, _tprefix: &str) -> Result<()> { + seq_print!( + m, + "{}node work {}: u{:016x} c{:016x}\n", + prefix, + self.node.debug_id, + self.node.ptr, + self.node.cookie, + ); + Ok(()) + } +} |
