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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/acpi/reboot.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/acpi/reboot.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/acpi/reboot.c | 82 |
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/reboot.c b/drivers/acpi/reboot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b79b7c99c --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/acpi/reboot.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ACPI: " fmt + +#include <linux/pci.h> +#include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <acpi/reboot.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI +static void acpi_pci_reboot(struct acpi_generic_address *rr, u8 reset_value) +{ + unsigned int devfn; + struct pci_bus *bus0; + + /* The reset register can only live on bus 0. */ + bus0 = pci_find_bus(0, 0); + if (!bus0) + return; + /* Form PCI device/function pair. */ + devfn = PCI_DEVFN((rr->address >> 32) & 0xffff, + (rr->address >> 16) & 0xffff); + pr_debug("Resetting with ACPI PCI RESET_REG.\n"); + /* Write the value that resets us. */ + pci_bus_write_config_byte(bus0, devfn, + (rr->address & 0xffff), reset_value); +} +#else +static inline void acpi_pci_reboot(struct acpi_generic_address *rr, + u8 reset_value) +{ + pr_warn_once("PCI configuration space access is not supported\n"); +} +#endif + +void acpi_reboot(void) +{ + struct acpi_generic_address *rr; + u8 reset_value; + + if (acpi_disabled) + return; + + rr = &acpi_gbl_FADT.reset_register; + + /* ACPI reset register was only introduced with v2 of the FADT */ + + if (acpi_gbl_FADT.header.revision < 2) + return; + + /* Is the reset register supported? The spec says we should be + * checking the bit width and bit offset, but Windows ignores + * these fields */ + if (!(acpi_gbl_FADT.flags & ACPI_FADT_RESET_REGISTER)) + return; + + reset_value = acpi_gbl_FADT.reset_value; + + /* The reset register can only exist in I/O, Memory or PCI config space + * on a device on bus 0. */ + switch (rr->space_id) { + case ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PCI_CONFIG: + acpi_pci_reboot(rr, reset_value); + break; + + case ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY: + case ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO: + pr_debug("ACPI MEMORY or I/O RESET_REG.\n"); + acpi_reset(); + break; + } + + /* + * Some platforms do not shut down immediately after writing to the + * ACPI reset register, and this results in racing with the + * subsequent reboot mechanism. + * + * The 15ms delay has been found to be long enough for the system + * to reboot on the affected platforms. + */ + mdelay(15); +} |
