summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/drivers/acpi/reboot.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/acpi/reboot.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/acpi/reboot.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/acpi/reboot.c82
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/reboot.c b/drivers/acpi/reboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b79b7c99c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/acpi/reboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ACPI: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <acpi/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PCI
+static void acpi_pci_reboot(struct acpi_generic_address *rr, u8 reset_value)
+{
+ unsigned int devfn;
+ struct pci_bus *bus0;
+
+ /* The reset register can only live on bus 0. */
+ bus0 = pci_find_bus(0, 0);
+ if (!bus0)
+ return;
+ /* Form PCI device/function pair. */
+ devfn = PCI_DEVFN((rr->address >> 32) & 0xffff,
+ (rr->address >> 16) & 0xffff);
+ pr_debug("Resetting with ACPI PCI RESET_REG.\n");
+ /* Write the value that resets us. */
+ pci_bus_write_config_byte(bus0, devfn,
+ (rr->address & 0xffff), reset_value);
+}
+#else
+static inline void acpi_pci_reboot(struct acpi_generic_address *rr,
+ u8 reset_value)
+{
+ pr_warn_once("PCI configuration space access is not supported\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+void acpi_reboot(void)
+{
+ struct acpi_generic_address *rr;
+ u8 reset_value;
+
+ if (acpi_disabled)
+ return;
+
+ rr = &acpi_gbl_FADT.reset_register;
+
+ /* ACPI reset register was only introduced with v2 of the FADT */
+
+ if (acpi_gbl_FADT.header.revision < 2)
+ return;
+
+ /* Is the reset register supported? The spec says we should be
+ * checking the bit width and bit offset, but Windows ignores
+ * these fields */
+ if (!(acpi_gbl_FADT.flags & ACPI_FADT_RESET_REGISTER))
+ return;
+
+ reset_value = acpi_gbl_FADT.reset_value;
+
+ /* The reset register can only exist in I/O, Memory or PCI config space
+ * on a device on bus 0. */
+ switch (rr->space_id) {
+ case ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PCI_CONFIG:
+ acpi_pci_reboot(rr, reset_value);
+ break;
+
+ case ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY:
+ case ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO:
+ pr_debug("ACPI MEMORY or I/O RESET_REG.\n");
+ acpi_reset();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Some platforms do not shut down immediately after writing to the
+ * ACPI reset register, and this results in racing with the
+ * subsequent reboot mechanism.
+ *
+ * The 15ms delay has been found to be long enough for the system
+ * to reboot on the affected platforms.
+ */
+ mdelay(15);
+}