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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/acpi/bgrt.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/acpi/bgrt.c94
1 files changed, 94 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0fdd581ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * BGRT boot graphic support
+ * Authors: Matthew Garrett, Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
+ * Copyright 2012 Red Hat, Inc <mjg@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright 2012 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
+
+static void *bgrt_image;
+static struct kobject *bgrt_kobj;
+
+#define BGRT_SHOW(_name, _member) \
+ static ssize_t _name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) \
+ { \
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bgrt_tab._member); \
+ } \
+ static struct kobj_attribute bgrt_attr_##_name = __ATTR_RO(_name)
+
+BGRT_SHOW(version, version);
+BGRT_SHOW(status, status);
+BGRT_SHOW(type, image_type);
+BGRT_SHOW(xoffset, image_offset_x);
+BGRT_SHOW(yoffset, image_offset_y);
+
+static __ro_after_init BIN_ATTR_SIMPLE_RO(image);
+
+static struct attribute *bgrt_attributes[] = {
+ &bgrt_attr_version.attr,
+ &bgrt_attr_status.attr,
+ &bgrt_attr_type.attr,
+ &bgrt_attr_xoffset.attr,
+ &bgrt_attr_yoffset.attr,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static const struct bin_attribute *const bgrt_bin_attributes[] = {
+ &bin_attr_image,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group bgrt_attribute_group = {
+ .attrs = bgrt_attributes,
+ .bin_attrs = bgrt_bin_attributes,
+};
+
+int __init acpi_parse_bgrt(struct acpi_table_header *table)
+{
+ efi_bgrt_init(table);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init bgrt_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!bgrt_tab.image_address)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab.image_address, bgrt_image_size,
+ MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!bgrt_image) {
+ pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ bin_attr_image.private = bgrt_image;
+ bin_attr_image.size = bgrt_image_size;
+
+ bgrt_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("bgrt", acpi_kobj);
+ if (!bgrt_kobj) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_memmap;
+ }
+
+ ret = sysfs_create_group(bgrt_kobj, &bgrt_attribute_group);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_kobject;
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_kobject:
+ kobject_put(bgrt_kobj);
+out_memmap:
+ memunmap(bgrt_image);
+ return ret;
+}
+device_initcall(bgrt_init);