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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /drivers/acpi/bgrt.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/acpi/bgrt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/acpi/bgrt.c | 94 |
1 files changed, 94 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0fdd581ef --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * BGRT boot graphic support + * Authors: Matthew Garrett, Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> + * Copyright 2012 Red Hat, Inc <mjg@redhat.com> + * Copyright 2012 Intel Corporation + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/sysfs.h> +#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h> + +static void *bgrt_image; +static struct kobject *bgrt_kobj; + +#define BGRT_SHOW(_name, _member) \ + static ssize_t _name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \ + struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) \ + { \ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bgrt_tab._member); \ + } \ + static struct kobj_attribute bgrt_attr_##_name = __ATTR_RO(_name) + +BGRT_SHOW(version, version); +BGRT_SHOW(status, status); +BGRT_SHOW(type, image_type); +BGRT_SHOW(xoffset, image_offset_x); +BGRT_SHOW(yoffset, image_offset_y); + +static __ro_after_init BIN_ATTR_SIMPLE_RO(image); + +static struct attribute *bgrt_attributes[] = { + &bgrt_attr_version.attr, + &bgrt_attr_status.attr, + &bgrt_attr_type.attr, + &bgrt_attr_xoffset.attr, + &bgrt_attr_yoffset.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct bin_attribute *const bgrt_bin_attributes[] = { + &bin_attr_image, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group bgrt_attribute_group = { + .attrs = bgrt_attributes, + .bin_attrs = bgrt_bin_attributes, +}; + +int __init acpi_parse_bgrt(struct acpi_table_header *table) +{ + efi_bgrt_init(table); + return 0; +} + +static int __init bgrt_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (!bgrt_tab.image_address) + return -ENODEV; + + bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab.image_address, bgrt_image_size, + MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!bgrt_image) { + pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + bin_attr_image.private = bgrt_image; + bin_attr_image.size = bgrt_image_size; + + bgrt_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("bgrt", acpi_kobj); + if (!bgrt_kobj) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_memmap; + } + + ret = sysfs_create_group(bgrt_kobj, &bgrt_attribute_group); + if (ret) + goto out_kobject; + + return 0; + +out_kobject: + kobject_put(bgrt_kobj); +out_memmap: + memunmap(bgrt_image); + return ret; +} +device_initcall(bgrt_init); |
