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| author | Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com> | 2026-07-28 03:16:42 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> | 2026-08-05 16:15:51 +0100 |
| commit | 1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66 (patch) | |
| tree | e8ee4ac80f87e2ad1b6b0c877eccbb62b0915c02 /crypto/xcbc.c | |
| download | linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.tar.gz linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.zip | |
ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted
When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().
If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.
Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.
For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.
Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock.
Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/xcbc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/xcbc.c | 208 |
1 files changed, 208 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/xcbc.c b/crypto/xcbc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6c5f6766f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/xcbc.c @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Copyright (C)2006 USAGI/WIDE Project + * + * Author: + * Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org> + */ + +#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h> +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <crypto/utils.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +static u_int32_t ks[12] = {0x01010101, 0x01010101, 0x01010101, 0x01010101, + 0x02020202, 0x02020202, 0x02020202, 0x02020202, + 0x03030303, 0x03030303, 0x03030303, 0x03030303}; + +/* + * +------------------------ + * | <parent tfm> + * +------------------------ + * | xcbc_tfm_ctx + * +------------------------ + * | consts (block size * 2) + * +------------------------ + */ +struct xcbc_tfm_ctx { + struct crypto_cipher *child; + u8 consts[]; +}; + +#define XCBC_BLOCKSIZE 16 + +static int crypto_xcbc_digest_setkey(struct crypto_shash *parent, + const u8 *inkey, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct xcbc_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent); + u8 *consts = ctx->consts; + int err = 0; + u8 key1[XCBC_BLOCKSIZE]; + int bs = sizeof(key1); + + if ((err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, inkey, keylen))) + return err; + + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, consts, (u8 *)ks + bs); + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, consts + bs, (u8 *)ks + bs * 2); + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, key1, (u8 *)ks); + + return crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, key1, bs); + +} + +static int crypto_xcbc_digest_init(struct shash_desc *pdesc) +{ + int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(pdesc->tfm); + u8 *prev = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc); + + memset(prev, 0, bs); + return 0; +} + +static int crypto_xcbc_digest_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm; + struct xcbc_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent); + struct crypto_cipher *tfm = tctx->child; + int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(parent); + u8 *prev = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc); + + do { + crypto_xor(prev, p, bs); + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, prev, prev); + p += bs; + len -= bs; + } while (len >= bs); + return len; +} + +static int crypto_xcbc_digest_finup(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *src, + unsigned int len, u8 *out) +{ + struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm; + struct xcbc_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent); + struct crypto_cipher *tfm = tctx->child; + int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(parent); + u8 *prev = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc); + unsigned int offset = 0; + + crypto_xor(prev, src, len); + if (len != bs) { + prev[len] ^= 0x80; + offset += bs; + } + crypto_xor(prev, &tctx->consts[offset], bs); + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, out, prev); + return 0; +} + +static int xcbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct crypto_cipher *cipher; + struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg; + struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst); + struct xcbc_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn); + if (IS_ERR(cipher)) + return PTR_ERR(cipher); + + ctx->child = cipher; + + return 0; +}; + +static void xcbc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct xcbc_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child); +} + +static int xcbc_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) +{ + struct shash_instance *inst; + struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn; + struct crypto_alg *alg; + u32 mask; + int err; + + err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH, &mask); + if (err) + return err; + + inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*spawn), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!inst) + return -ENOMEM; + spawn = shash_instance_ctx(inst); + + err = crypto_grab_cipher(spawn, shash_crypto_instance(inst), + crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask); + if (err) + goto err_free_inst; + alg = crypto_spawn_cipher_alg(spawn); + + err = -EINVAL; + if (alg->cra_blocksize != XCBC_BLOCKSIZE) + goto err_free_inst; + + err = crypto_inst_setname(shash_crypto_instance(inst), tmpl->name, alg); + if (err) + goto err_free_inst; + + inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority; + inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize; + inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct xcbc_tfm_ctx) + + alg->cra_blocksize * 2; + inst->alg.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_AHASH_ALG_BLOCK_ONLY | + CRYPTO_AHASH_ALG_FINAL_NONZERO; + + inst->alg.digestsize = alg->cra_blocksize; + inst->alg.descsize = alg->cra_blocksize; + + inst->alg.base.cra_init = xcbc_init_tfm; + inst->alg.base.cra_exit = xcbc_exit_tfm; + + inst->alg.init = crypto_xcbc_digest_init; + inst->alg.update = crypto_xcbc_digest_update; + inst->alg.finup = crypto_xcbc_digest_finup; + inst->alg.setkey = crypto_xcbc_digest_setkey; + + inst->free = shash_free_singlespawn_instance; + + err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst); + if (err) { +err_free_inst: + shash_free_singlespawn_instance(inst); + } + return err; +} + +static struct crypto_template crypto_xcbc_tmpl = { + .name = "xcbc", + .create = xcbc_create, + .module = THIS_MODULE, +}; + +static int __init crypto_xcbc_module_init(void) +{ + return crypto_register_template(&crypto_xcbc_tmpl); +} + +static void __exit crypto_xcbc_module_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_xcbc_tmpl); +} + +module_init(crypto_xcbc_module_init); +module_exit(crypto_xcbc_module_exit); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("XCBC keyed hash algorithm"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xcbc"); +MODULE_IMPORT_NS("CRYPTO_INTERNAL"); |
