staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/ripemd.h b/crypto/ripemd.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b977785e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ripemd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Common values for RIPEMD algorithms
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_RMD_H
+#define _CRYPTO_RMD_H
+
+#define RMD160_DIGEST_SIZE      20
+#define RMD160_BLOCK_SIZE       64
+
+/* initial values  */
+#define RMD_H0  0x67452301UL
+#define RMD_H1  0xefcdab89UL
+#define RMD_H2  0x98badcfeUL
+#define RMD_H3  0x10325476UL
+#define RMD_H4  0xc3d2e1f0UL
+
+/* constants */
+#define RMD_K1  0x00000000UL
+#define RMD_K2  0x5a827999UL
+#define RMD_K3  0x6ed9eba1UL
+#define RMD_K4  0x8f1bbcdcUL
+#define RMD_K5  0xa953fd4eUL
+#define RMD_K6  0x50a28be6UL
+#define RMD_K7  0x5c4dd124UL
+#define RMD_K8  0x6d703ef3UL
+#define RMD_K9  0x7a6d76e9UL
+
+#endif