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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /crypto/lzo.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/lzo.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/lzo.c101
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/lzo.c b/crypto/lzo.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d43242b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/lzo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/scompress.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/lzo.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+static void *lzo_alloc_ctx(void)
+{
+ void *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kvmalloc(LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void lzo_free_ctx(void *ctx)
+{
+ kvfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static int __lzo_compress(const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen, void *ctx)
+{
+ size_t tmp_len = *dlen; /* size_t(ulong) <-> uint on 64 bit */
+ int err;
+
+ err = lzo1x_1_compress_safe(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx);
+
+ if (err != LZO_E_OK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *dlen = tmp_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int lzo_scompress(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ return __lzo_compress(src, slen, dst, dlen, ctx);
+}
+
+static int __lzo_decompress(const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
+{
+ int err;
+ size_t tmp_len = *dlen; /* size_t(ulong) <-> uint on 64 bit */
+
+ err = lzo1x_decompress_safe(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len);
+
+ if (err != LZO_E_OK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *dlen = tmp_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int lzo_sdecompress(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ return __lzo_decompress(src, slen, dst, dlen);
+}
+
+static struct scomp_alg scomp = {
+ .streams = {
+ .alloc_ctx = lzo_alloc_ctx,
+ .free_ctx = lzo_free_ctx,
+ },
+ .compress = lzo_scompress,
+ .decompress = lzo_sdecompress,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "lzo",
+ .cra_driver_name = "lzo-scomp",
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ }
+};
+
+static int __init lzo_mod_init(void)
+{
+ return crypto_register_scomp(&scomp);
+}
+
+static void __exit lzo_mod_fini(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_scomp(&scomp);
+}
+
+module_init(lzo_mod_init);
+module_exit(lzo_mod_fini);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LZO Compression Algorithm");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("lzo");