diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /crypto/lz4.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/lz4.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/lz4.c | 99 |
1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/lz4.c b/crypto/lz4.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..57b713516 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/lz4.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * Copyright (c) 2013 Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com> + */ + +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/lz4.h> +#include <crypto/internal/scompress.h> + +static void *lz4_alloc_ctx(void) +{ + void *ctx; + + ctx = vmalloc(LZ4_MEM_COMPRESS); + if (!ctx) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + return ctx; +} + +static void lz4_free_ctx(void *ctx) +{ + vfree(ctx); +} + +static int __lz4_compress_crypto(const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, + u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen, void *ctx) +{ + int out_len = LZ4_compress_default(src, dst, + slen, *dlen, ctx); + + if (!out_len) + return -EINVAL; + + *dlen = out_len; + return 0; +} + +static int lz4_scompress(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, const u8 *src, + unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen, + void *ctx) +{ + return __lz4_compress_crypto(src, slen, dst, dlen, ctx); +} + +static int __lz4_decompress_crypto(const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, + u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen, void *ctx) +{ + int out_len = LZ4_decompress_safe(src, dst, slen, *dlen); + + if (out_len < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + *dlen = out_len; + return 0; +} + +static int lz4_sdecompress(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, const u8 *src, + unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen, + void *ctx) +{ + return __lz4_decompress_crypto(src, slen, dst, dlen, NULL); +} + +static struct scomp_alg scomp = { + .streams = { + .alloc_ctx = lz4_alloc_ctx, + .free_ctx = lz4_free_ctx, + }, + .compress = lz4_scompress, + .decompress = lz4_sdecompress, + .base = { + .cra_name = "lz4", + .cra_driver_name = "lz4-scomp", + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +static int __init lz4_mod_init(void) +{ + return crypto_register_scomp(&scomp); +} + +static void __exit lz4_mod_fini(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_scomp(&scomp); +} + +module_init(lz4_mod_init); +module_exit(lz4_mod_fini); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LZ4 Compression Algorithm"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("lz4"); |
