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authorSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400
committerSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400
commit4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch)
tree350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /crypto/echainiv.c
downloadlinux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz
linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other call. Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after the mute is taken in case of races. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock") Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/echainiv.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/echainiv.c153
1 files changed, 153 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/echainiv.c b/crypto/echainiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e0a2d3209
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/echainiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * echainiv: Encrypted Chain IV Generator
+ *
+ * This generator generates an IV based on a sequence number by multiplying
+ * it with a salt and then encrypting it with the same key as used to encrypt
+ * the plain text. This algorithm requires that the block size be equal
+ * to the IV size. It is mainly useful for CBC.
+ *
+ * This generator can only be used by algorithms where authentication
+ * is performed after encryption (i.e., authenc).
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/geniv.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+static int echainiv_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct aead_geniv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ __be64 nseqno;
+ u64 seqno;
+ u8 *info;
+ unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv);
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ info = req->iv;
+
+ if (req->src != req->dst)
+ memcpy_sglist(req->dst, req->src,
+ req->assoclen + req->cryptlen);
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags,
+ req->base.complete, req->base.data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->dst, req->dst,
+ req->cryptlen, info);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+
+ memcpy(&nseqno, info + ivsize - 8, 8);
+ seqno = be64_to_cpu(nseqno);
+ memset(info, 0, ivsize);
+
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(info, req->dst, req->assoclen, ivsize, 1);
+
+ do {
+ u64 a;
+
+ memcpy(&a, ctx->salt + ivsize - 8, 8);
+
+ a |= 1;
+ a *= seqno;
+
+ memcpy(info + ivsize - 8, &a, 8);
+ } while ((ivsize -= 8));
+
+ return crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int echainiv_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct aead_geniv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv);
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ compl = req->base.complete;
+ data = req->base.data;
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst,
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, req->iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen + ivsize);
+
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->src, req->assoclen, ivsize, 0);
+
+ return crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int echainiv_aead_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ struct aead_instance *inst;
+ int err;
+
+ inst = aead_geniv_alloc(tmpl, tb);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(inst))
+ return PTR_ERR(inst);
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (inst->alg.ivsize & (sizeof(u64) - 1) || !inst->alg.ivsize)
+ goto free_inst;
+
+ inst->alg.encrypt = echainiv_encrypt;
+ inst->alg.decrypt = echainiv_decrypt;
+
+ inst->alg.init = aead_init_geniv;
+ inst->alg.exit = aead_exit_geniv;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aead_geniv_ctx);
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize += inst->alg.ivsize;
+
+ err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+ if (err) {
+free_inst:
+ inst->free(inst);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_template echainiv_tmpl = {
+ .name = "echainiv",
+ .create = echainiv_aead_create,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init echainiv_module_init(void)
+{
+ return crypto_register_template(&echainiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit echainiv_module_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_template(&echainiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+module_init(echainiv_module_init);
+module_exit(echainiv_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Encrypted Chain IV Generator");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("echainiv");