dmaengine: fix use-after-free in dma_chan_put() and dma_release_channel()grafted

When dma_device_put() drops the last reference on chan->device->ref,
dma_device_release() runs and may free the dma_device along with its
channels.

dma_chan_put() then still reads chan->device->owner via
dma_chan_to_owner() for the trailing module_put(). KASAN catches it:

	slab-use-after-free in dma_chan_put+0x3e6/0x4c0
	Read of size 8 by task insmod/6319
	Freed by task 6319:
	  kfree+0x225/0x470
	  dma_chan_put+0x395/0x4c0
	  dmaengine_put+0xf8/0x160

Cache the module owner in dma_chan_put() before the put so the trailing
module_put() does not need chan->device.

Fixes: 8ad342a86359 ("dmaengine: Add reference counting to dma_device struct")
Suggested-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260518-dmaengine-kref-fix-v1-1-4d6125048fb7@amd.com
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822-dmaengine-kref-fix-v5-3-d4a4ee47d927@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 91 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/cipher.c b/crypto/cipher.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9dab656a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/cipher.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * Single-block cipher operations.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			    unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct cipher_alg *cia = crypto_cipher_alg(tfm);
+	unsigned long alignmask = crypto_cipher_alignmask(tfm);
+	int ret;
+	u8 *buffer, *alignbuffer;
+	unsigned long absize;
+
+	absize = keylen + alignmask;
+	buffer = kmalloc(absize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
+	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
+	ret = cia->cia_setkey(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), alignbuffer, keylen);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
+	return ret;
+
+}
+
+int crypto_cipher_setkey(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
+			 const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct cipher_alg *cia = crypto_cipher_alg(tfm);
+	unsigned long alignmask = crypto_cipher_alignmask(tfm);
+
+	if (keylen < cia->cia_min_keysize || keylen > cia->cia_max_keysize)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)
+		return setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
+
+	return cia->cia_setkey(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), key, keylen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(crypto_cipher_setkey, "CRYPTO_INTERNAL");
+
+static inline void cipher_crypt_one(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
+				    u8 *dst, const u8 *src, bool enc)
+{
+	unsigned long alignmask = crypto_cipher_alignmask(tfm);
+	struct cipher_alg *cia = crypto_cipher_alg(tfm);
+	void (*fn)(struct crypto_tfm *, u8 *, const u8 *) =
+		enc ? cia->cia_encrypt : cia->cia_decrypt;
+
+	if (unlikely(((unsigned long)dst | (unsigned long)src) & alignmask)) {
+		unsigned int bs = crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm);
+		u8 buffer[MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE + MAX_CIPHER_ALIGNMASK];
+		u8 *tmp = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
+
+		memcpy(tmp, src, bs);
+		fn(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), tmp, tmp);
+		memcpy(dst, tmp, bs);
+	} else {
+		fn(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), dst, src);
+	}
+}
+
+void crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
+			       u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	cipher_crypt_one(tfm, dst, src, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(crypto_cipher_encrypt_one, "CRYPTO_INTERNAL");
+
+void crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
+			       u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	cipher_crypt_one(tfm, dst, src, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(crypto_cipher_decrypt_one, "CRYPTO_INTERNAL");