Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Don't destroy user event fields when removal fails

   User event fields are destroyed before the event is removed from
   visibility. But that can fail leaving the still visible event with no
   fields. Move the destroying of the fields to after the event is
   successfully removed from visibility.

 - Initialize function graph state is fork before calling
   copy_exec_state()

   For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new
   task_exec_state. If that allocation fails, ftrace_graph_exit_task()
   will free the tasks ret_stack pointer. Since that pointer is still
   using the parent's ret_stack, it mistakenly frees the parent's
   pointer too.

   Call ftrace_graph_init() on the task first which will NULL out the
   new tasks's ret_stack and if the copy fails, it will not free
   anything.

 - Remove FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX

   The macro FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX was added but never used. Remove it.

 - Save ent_size in function graph printing of nested functions

   The function graph tracer needs to look at the next event to see if
   the next event is the return of the current function entry. If it is,
   it prints a single line:

	ktime_get();

   Otherwise it prints it like a nested function:

	tick_nohz_irq_exit() {
	    ktime_get();
	    kcpustat_irq_exit();
	}

   In order to look at the next event, it must save the current event so
   that it has the information to print from it. It saves the event in
   the iterator descriptor called "ent". What it doesn't save is the
   ent_size of the event which is now used to know if the function graph
   arguments are to be printed. The peek doesn't save the size so the
   size used happens to be that of the size of the last event that was
   seen.

   Save the entry event size in the iterator descriptor so that the
   correct size is used.

 - Fix several errors with freeing data in the histogram code

   The histogram code had a lot of leaked or or incorrect accounting
   when failures happen. Correct them.

 - Fix histogram regression of .percent and .graph modifiers

   Up until 6.3 histogram values could have "percent" or "graph"
   modifiers that changed how they were printed. But a change that added
   restricting histograms values from being strings, stack traces and
   other modifiers inadvertently prevented them from using the percent
   and graph modifiers, which were legal use cases for values.

   Put back the percent and graph modifiers.

 - Fix various typos in the comments

 - Set the trace_clock before initializing a histogram with clock
   argument

   The histogram API allows the user to specific which trace clock to
   use via a "clock=" string. The histogram is set up first before the
   clock is checked. If the passed in clock is not valid, it exits
   without fully fixing up the histogram leaving it on the list and a
   use-after-free can trigger.

   Update the clock argument first and if it fails then exit gracefully
   before the histogram trigger is placed on any lists.

 - Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event

   The function ftrace_set_clr_event() modifies the parse string and
   needs to put it back to what was passed in. It searches for ":mod:"
   via a strsep() but fails to put back the first ':' in the string.

   Add back the ':' in the passed in string.

 - Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file

   The options files are dynamically created and some tracers add their
   own options. When a tracer adds their own list of options, the
   trace_array holding them has an array to hold the list of options for
   each tracer. This array increases in size via a krealloc(), and the
   new entry gets a newly allocated array to hold the options of the new
   tracer being added.

   The element in each entry of the tracer's option array holds a
   pointer back to the trace_array, a pointer to the tracer it is
   associated to, a pointer to the flags of the option.

   The issue is that these arrays are freed when the trace_array is
   freed when its instance it represents is removed from the instances
   directory. There's a race that an open of one of these options files
   can happen when the instance is being removed.

   Add a new helper function to be called by the open function of the
   options file to iterate all existing trace_arrays under a lock and
   find the one that has the given option element in one of it's tracer
   arrays. If found, then update the associated trace_array's reference
   counter to keep it from being freed. If not found, have the open call
   return -ENODEV.

 - Disable interrupts when acquiring the lock in rb_wake_up_waiters()

   The function rb_wake_up_waiters() assumes it will be called in
   interrupt context and does not disable irqs when taking
   cpu_buffer->reader_lock, which can be called in hard interrupt
   context. The issue is in PREEMPT_RT, this function is called in
   thread context leaving this lock open to a deadlock.

   Take the lock with interrupts disabled.

 - Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash

   The tmp_ops used in update_ftrace_direct_mod() assigns its
   filter_hash field directly, but that field is annotated as __rcu and
   sparse complains. Assign it with rcu_assign_pointer()

 - Fix use-after-free in enable_trigger_private_data_free()

   The trace_event_call is accessed through the event_trigger_data's
   trace_event_file pointer to put the trace_event_call on freeing. The
   issue is that the trace_event_file data may have been freed already
   causing a use-after-free. Add a field to the event_trigger_data that
   points directly to the trace_event_call so that it can decrement its
   reference directly without needing to go through the
   trace_event_file.

 - Fix accounting of buffer data remote headers

   trace_buffer_desc_size() and trace_remote_alloc_buffer() undercount
   the number of pages is needed for the asked for size as it doesn't
   take into account the meta data on each page. Add a helper function
   to do the calculation properly and use that in these functions.

 - Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing

   The number of pages per remote ring buffer is capped by
   ring_buffer_desc::nr_page_va (32 bits). A buffer_size large enough to
   overflow that field would silently allocate a descriptor smaller than
   what was asked for.

 - Do not resize the subbuf order if any per_cpu buffer is disabled

   The mmapping of ring buffers disables resizing the subbuffers, but it
   is done per-cpu whereas the subbuf size change is done for all the
   per_cpu buffers under the buffer->mutex. It could change the size of
   some while the mapping is happening on others. Have the resize of the
   subbuf order check all the per_cpu buffers under the lock to see if
   any of them is disabled before starting and causing an inconsistency
   between buffers that are being mapped.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: (25 commits)
  ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
  tracing/remotes: Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing
  tracing/remotes: Account for ring buffer page header in size calculation
  tracing: Don't dereference trace_event_file in deferred trigger free
  ftrace: Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash
  ring-buffer: Acquire the lock with irqsave in rb_wake_up_waiters()
  tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
  tracing: Fix ring_buffer_read_page_size() kernel-doc
  tracing: Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event()
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
  tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
  tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
  tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
  tracing: Fix typo "preceeded" in comment
  tracing: Fix typo "availabe" in comment
  tracing: Let histogram values keep the percent and graph modifiers
  tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
  tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
  tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
  ...

1 files changed, 941 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/ccm.c b/crypto/ccm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..916441e4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ccm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * CCM: Counter with CBC-MAC
+ *
+ * (C) Copyright IBM Corp. 2007 - Joy Latten <latten@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+struct ccm_instance_ctx {
+	struct crypto_skcipher_spawn ctr;
+	struct crypto_ahash_spawn mac;
+};
+
+struct crypto_ccm_ctx {
+	struct crypto_ahash *mac;
+	struct crypto_skcipher *ctr;
+};
+
+struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx {
+	struct crypto_aead *child;
+	u8 nonce[3];
+};
+
+struct crypto_rfc4309_req_ctx {
+	struct scatterlist src[3];
+	struct scatterlist dst[3];
+	struct aead_request subreq;
+};
+
+struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx {
+	u8 odata[16];
+	u8 idata[16];
+	u8 auth_tag[16];
+	u32 flags;
+	struct scatterlist src[3];
+	struct scatterlist dst[3];
+	union {
+		struct ahash_request ahreq;
+		struct skcipher_request skreq;
+	};
+};
+
+struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx {
+	struct crypto_cipher *child;
+};
+
+static inline struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *crypto_ccm_reqctx(
+	struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	unsigned long align = crypto_aead_alignmask(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
+
+	return (void *)PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)aead_request_ctx(req), align + 1);
+}
+
+static int set_msg_len(u8 *block, unsigned int msglen, int csize)
+{
+	__be32 data;
+
+	memset(block, 0, csize);
+	block += csize;
+
+	if (csize >= 4)
+		csize = 4;
+	else if (msglen > (1 << (8 * csize)))
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	data = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
+	memcpy(block - csize, (u8 *)&data + 4 - csize, csize);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
+			     unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct crypto_skcipher *ctr = ctx->ctr;
+	struct crypto_ahash *mac = ctx->mac;
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(ctr, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctr, crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) &
+				       CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctr, key, keylen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_ahash_clear_flags(mac, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_ahash_set_flags(mac, crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) &
+				    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	return crypto_ahash_setkey(mac, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+				  unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 4:
+	case 6:
+	case 8:
+	case 10:
+	case 12:
+	case 14:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int format_input(u8 *info, struct aead_request *req,
+			unsigned int cryptlen)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	unsigned int lp = req->iv[0];
+	unsigned int l = lp + 1;
+	unsigned int m;
+
+	m = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+
+	memcpy(info, req->iv, 16);
+
+	/* format control info per RFC 3610 and
+	 * NIST Special Publication 800-38C
+	 */
+	*info |= (8 * ((m - 2) / 2));
+	if (req->assoclen)
+		*info |= 64;
+
+	return set_msg_len(info + 16 - l, cryptlen, l);
+}
+
+static int format_adata(u8 *adata, unsigned int a)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+
+	/* add control info for associated data
+	 * RFC 3610 and NIST Special Publication 800-38C
+	 */
+	if (a < 65280) {
+		*(__be16 *)adata = cpu_to_be16(a);
+		len = 2;
+	} else  {
+		*(__be16 *)adata = cpu_to_be16(0xfffe);
+		*(__be32 *)&adata[2] = cpu_to_be32(a);
+		len = 6;
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_auth(struct aead_request *req, struct scatterlist *plain,
+			   unsigned int cryptlen)
+{
+	struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct ahash_request *ahreq = &pctx->ahreq;
+	unsigned int assoclen = req->assoclen;
+	struct scatterlist sg[3];
+	u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
+	u8 *idata = pctx->idata;
+	int ilen, err;
+
+	/* format control data for input */
+	err = format_input(odata, req, cryptlen);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	sg_init_table(sg, 3);
+	sg_set_buf(&sg[0], odata, 16);
+
+	/* format associated data and compute into mac */
+	if (assoclen) {
+		ilen = format_adata(idata, assoclen);
+		sg_set_buf(&sg[1], idata, ilen);
+		sg_chain(sg, 3, req->src);
+	} else {
+		ilen = 0;
+		sg_chain(sg, 2, req->src);
+	}
+
+	ahash_request_set_tfm(ahreq, ctx->mac);
+	ahash_request_set_callback(ahreq, pctx->flags, NULL, NULL);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, sg, NULL, assoclen + ilen + 16);
+	err = crypto_ahash_init(ahreq);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	err = crypto_ahash_update(ahreq);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* we need to pad the MAC input to a round multiple of the block size */
+	ilen = 16 - (assoclen + ilen) % 16;
+	if (ilen < 16) {
+		memset(idata, 0, ilen);
+		sg_init_table(sg, 2);
+		sg_set_buf(&sg[0], idata, ilen);
+		if (plain)
+			sg_chain(sg, 2, plain);
+		plain = sg;
+		cryptlen += ilen;
+	}
+
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, plain, odata, cryptlen);
+	err = crypto_ahash_finup(ahreq);
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void crypto_ccm_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
+{
+	struct aead_request *req = data;
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
+	u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
+
+	if (!err)
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(odata, req->dst,
+					 req->assoclen + req->cryptlen,
+					 crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1);
+	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static inline int crypto_ccm_check_iv(const u8 *iv)
+{
+	/* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
+	if (1 > iv[0] || iv[0] > 7)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_init_crypt(struct aead_request *req, u8 *tag)
+{
+	struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
+	struct scatterlist *sg;
+	u8 *iv = req->iv;
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_ccm_check_iv(iv);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	pctx->flags = aead_request_flags(req);
+
+	 /* Note: rfc 3610 and NIST 800-38C require counter of
+	 * zero to encrypt auth tag.
+	 */
+	memset(iv + 15 - iv[0], 0, iv[0] + 1);
+
+	sg_init_table(pctx->src, 3);
+	sg_set_buf(pctx->src, tag, 16);
+	sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(pctx->src + 1, req->src, req->assoclen);
+	if (sg != pctx->src + 1)
+		sg_chain(pctx->src, 2, sg);
+
+	if (req->src != req->dst) {
+		sg_init_table(pctx->dst, 3);
+		sg_set_buf(pctx->dst, tag, 16);
+		sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(pctx->dst + 1, req->dst, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg != pctx->dst + 1)
+			sg_chain(pctx->dst, 2, sg);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
+	struct skcipher_request *skreq = &pctx->skreq;
+	struct scatterlist *dst;
+	unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
+	u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
+	u8 *iv = req->iv;
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_ccm_init_crypt(req, odata);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, sg_next(pctx->src), cryptlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	dst = pctx->src;
+	if (req->src != req->dst)
+		dst = pctx->dst;
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(skreq, ctx->ctr);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, pctx->flags,
+				      crypto_ccm_encrypt_done, req);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, pctx->src, dst, cryptlen + 16, iv);
+	err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(skreq);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* copy authtag to end of dst */
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(odata, sg_next(dst), cryptlen,
+				 crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void crypto_ccm_decrypt_done(void *data, int err)
+{
+	struct aead_request *req = data;
+	struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+	unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen - authsize;
+	struct scatterlist *dst;
+
+	pctx->flags = 0;
+
+	dst = sg_next(req->src == req->dst ? pctx->src : pctx->dst);
+
+	if (!err) {
+		err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, dst, cryptlen);
+		if (!err && crypto_memneq(pctx->auth_tag, pctx->odata, authsize))
+			err = -EBADMSG;
+	}
+	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
+	struct skcipher_request *skreq = &pctx->skreq;
+	struct scatterlist *dst;
+	unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+	unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
+	u8 *authtag = pctx->auth_tag;
+	u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
+	u8 *iv = pctx->idata;
+	int err;
+
+	cryptlen -= authsize;
+
+	err = crypto_ccm_init_crypt(req, authtag);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(authtag, sg_next(pctx->src), cryptlen,
+				 authsize, 0);
+
+	dst = pctx->src;
+	if (req->src != req->dst)
+		dst = pctx->dst;
+
+	memcpy(iv, req->iv, 16);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(skreq, ctx->ctr);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, pctx->flags,
+				      crypto_ccm_decrypt_done, req);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, pctx->src, dst, cryptlen + 16, iv);
+	err = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(skreq);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, sg_next(dst), cryptlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* verify */
+	if (crypto_memneq(authtag, odata, authsize))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct ccm_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_ahash *mac;
+	struct crypto_skcipher *ctr;
+	unsigned long align;
+	int err;
+
+	mac = crypto_spawn_ahash(&ictx->mac);
+	if (IS_ERR(mac))
+		return PTR_ERR(mac);
+
+	ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->ctr);
+	err = PTR_ERR(ctr);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctr))
+		goto err_free_mac;
+
+	ctx->mac = mac;
+	ctx->ctr = ctr;
+
+	align = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
+	align &= ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(
+		tfm,
+		align + sizeof(struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx) +
+		max(crypto_ahash_reqsize(mac), crypto_skcipher_reqsize(ctr)));
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_mac:
+	crypto_free_ahash(mac);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void crypto_ccm_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_ahash(ctx->mac);
+	crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->ctr);
+}
+
+static void crypto_ccm_free(struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct ccm_instance_ctx *ctx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_ahash(&ctx->mac);
+	crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->ctr);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+				    struct rtattr **tb,
+				    const char *ctr_name,
+				    const char *mac_name)
+{
+	struct skcipher_alg_common *ctr;
+	u32 mask;
+	struct aead_instance *inst;
+	struct ccm_instance_ctx *ictx;
+	struct hash_alg_common *mac;
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD, &mask);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!inst)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	err = crypto_grab_ahash(&ictx->mac, aead_crypto_instance(inst),
+				mac_name, 0, mask | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+	mac = crypto_spawn_ahash_alg(&ictx->mac);
+
+	err = -EINVAL;
+	if (strncmp(mac->base.cra_name, "cbcmac(", 7) != 0 ||
+	    mac->digestsize != 16)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->ctr, aead_crypto_instance(inst),
+				   ctr_name, 0, mask);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+	ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg_common(&ictx->ctr);
+
+	/* The skcipher algorithm must be CTR mode, using 16-byte blocks. */
+	err = -EINVAL;
+	if (strncmp(ctr->base.cra_name, "ctr(", 4) != 0 ||
+	    ctr->ivsize != 16 || ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	/* ctr and cbcmac must use the same underlying block cipher. */
+	if (strcmp(ctr->base.cra_name + 4, mac->base.cra_name + 7) != 0)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "ccm(%s", ctr->base.cra_name + 4) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "ccm_base(%s,%s)", ctr->base.cra_driver_name,
+		     mac->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = (mac->base.cra_priority +
+				       ctr->base.cra_priority) / 2;
+	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = 1;
+	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = ctr->base.cra_alignmask;
+	inst->alg.ivsize = 16;
+	inst->alg.chunksize = ctr->chunksize;
+	inst->alg.maxauthsize = 16;
+	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_ccm_ctx);
+	inst->alg.init = crypto_ccm_init_tfm;
+	inst->alg.exit = crypto_ccm_exit_tfm;
+	inst->alg.setkey = crypto_ccm_setkey;
+	inst->alg.setauthsize = crypto_ccm_setauthsize;
+	inst->alg.encrypt = crypto_ccm_encrypt;
+	inst->alg.decrypt = crypto_ccm_decrypt;
+
+	inst->free = crypto_ccm_free;
+
+	err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+	if (err) {
+err_free_inst:
+		crypto_ccm_free(inst);
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	const char *cipher_name;
+	char ctr_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	char mac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+
+	cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+	if (IS_ERR(cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(cipher_name);
+
+	if (snprintf(ctr_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "ctr(%s)",
+		     cipher_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+	if (snprintf(mac_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "cbcmac(%s)",
+		     cipher_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+	return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, mac_name);
+}
+
+static int crypto_ccm_base_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+				  struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	const char *ctr_name;
+	const char *mac_name;
+
+	ctr_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctr_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctr_name);
+
+	mac_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+	if (IS_ERR(mac_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(mac_name);
+
+	return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, mac_name);
+}
+
+static int crypto_rfc4309_setkey(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key,
+				 unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(parent);
+	struct crypto_aead *child = ctx->child;
+
+	if (keylen < 3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	keylen -= 3;
+	memcpy(ctx->nonce, key + keylen, 3);
+
+	crypto_aead_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(child, crypto_aead_get_flags(parent) &
+				     CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	return crypto_aead_setkey(child, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int crypto_rfc4309_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *parent,
+				      unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(parent);
+
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 8:
+	case 12:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return crypto_aead_setauthsize(ctx->child, authsize);
+}
+
+static struct aead_request *crypto_rfc4309_crypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_rfc4309_req_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct crypto_aead *child = ctx->child;
+	struct scatterlist *sg;
+	u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)(subreq + 1) + crypto_aead_reqsize(child),
+			   crypto_aead_alignmask(child) + 1);
+
+	/* L' */
+	iv[0] = 3;
+
+	memcpy(iv + 1, ctx->nonce, 3);
+	memcpy(iv + 4, req->iv, 8);
+
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(iv + 16, req->src, 0, req->assoclen - 8, 0);
+
+	sg_init_table(rctx->src, 3);
+	sg_set_buf(rctx->src, iv + 16, req->assoclen - 8);
+	sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->src + 1, req->src, req->assoclen);
+	if (sg != rctx->src + 1)
+		sg_chain(rctx->src, 2, sg);
+
+	if (req->src != req->dst) {
+		sg_init_table(rctx->dst, 3);
+		sg_set_buf(rctx->dst, iv + 16, req->assoclen - 8);
+		sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->dst + 1, req->dst, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg != rctx->dst + 1)
+			sg_chain(rctx->dst, 2, sg);
+	}
+
+	aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, child);
+	aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, req->base.complete,
+				  req->base.data);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, rctx->src,
+			       req->src == req->dst ? rctx->src : rctx->dst,
+			       req->cryptlen, iv);
+	aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen - 8);
+
+	return subreq;
+}
+
+static int crypto_rfc4309_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	if (req->assoclen != 16 && req->assoclen != 20)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	req = crypto_rfc4309_crypt(req);
+
+	return crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
+}
+
+static int crypto_rfc4309_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	if (req->assoclen != 16 && req->assoclen != 20)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	req = crypto_rfc4309_crypt(req);
+
+	return crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+}
+
+static int crypto_rfc4309_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	unsigned long align;
+
+	aead = crypto_spawn_aead(spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead))
+		return PTR_ERR(aead);
+
+	ctx->child = aead;
+
+	align = crypto_aead_alignmask(aead);
+	align &= ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(
+		tfm,
+		sizeof(struct crypto_rfc4309_req_ctx) +
+		ALIGN(crypto_aead_reqsize(aead), crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) +
+		align + 32);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypto_rfc4309_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_aead(ctx->child);
+}
+
+static void crypto_rfc4309_free(struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+	crypto_drop_aead(aead_instance_ctx(inst));
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static int crypto_rfc4309_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+				 struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	u32 mask;
+	struct aead_instance *inst;
+	struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn;
+	struct aead_alg *alg;
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD, &mask);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*spawn), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!inst)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spawn = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+	err = crypto_grab_aead(spawn, aead_crypto_instance(inst),
+			       crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(spawn);
+
+	err = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* We only support 16-byte blocks. */
+	if (crypto_aead_alg_ivsize(alg) != 16)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	/* Not a stream cipher? */
+	if (alg->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "rfc4309(%s)", alg->base.cra_name) >=
+	    CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ||
+	    snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "rfc4309(%s)", alg->base.cra_driver_name) >=
+	    CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority;
+	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = 1;
+	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask;
+
+	inst->alg.ivsize = 8;
+	inst->alg.chunksize = crypto_aead_alg_chunksize(alg);
+	inst->alg.maxauthsize = crypto_aead_alg_maxauthsize(alg);
+
+	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx);
+
+	inst->alg.init = crypto_rfc4309_init_tfm;
+	inst->alg.exit = crypto_rfc4309_exit_tfm;
+
+	inst->alg.setkey = crypto_rfc4309_setkey;
+	inst->alg.setauthsize = crypto_rfc4309_setauthsize;
+	inst->alg.encrypt = crypto_rfc4309_encrypt;
+	inst->alg.decrypt = crypto_rfc4309_decrypt;
+
+	inst->free = crypto_rfc4309_free;
+
+	err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+	if (err) {
+err_free_inst:
+		crypto_rfc4309_free(inst);
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_setkey(struct crypto_shash *parent,
+				     const u8 *inkey, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
+
+	return crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, inkey, keylen);
+}
+
+static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_init(struct shash_desc *pdesc)
+{
+	int bs = crypto_shash_digestsize(pdesc->tfm);
+	u8 *dg = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc);
+
+	memset(dg, 0, bs);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p,
+				       unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
+	struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
+	struct crypto_cipher *tfm = tctx->child;
+	int bs = crypto_shash_digestsize(parent);
+	u8 *dg = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc);
+
+	do {
+		crypto_xor(dg, p, bs);
+		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, dg, dg);
+		p += bs;
+		len -= bs;
+	} while (len >= bs);
+	return len;
+}
+
+static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_finup(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *src,
+				      unsigned int len, u8 *out)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
+	struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
+	struct crypto_cipher *tfm = tctx->child;
+	int bs = crypto_shash_digestsize(parent);
+	u8 *dg = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc);
+
+	if (len) {
+		crypto_xor(dg, src, len);
+		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, out, dg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	memcpy(out, dg, bs);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cbcmac_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
+	struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
+	struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(cipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(cipher);
+
+	ctx->child = cipher;
+
+	return 0;
+};
+
+static void cbcmac_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child);
+}
+
+static int cbcmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	struct shash_instance *inst;
+	struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn;
+	struct crypto_alg *alg;
+	u32 mask;
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH, &mask);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*spawn), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!inst)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	spawn = shash_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	err = crypto_grab_cipher(spawn, shash_crypto_instance(inst),
+				 crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+	alg = crypto_spawn_cipher_alg(spawn);
+
+	err = crypto_inst_setname(shash_crypto_instance(inst), tmpl->name, alg);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
+	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
+
+	inst->alg.digestsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
+	inst->alg.descsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
+
+	inst->alg.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_AHASH_ALG_BLOCK_ONLY;
+	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx);
+	inst->alg.base.cra_init = cbcmac_init_tfm;
+	inst->alg.base.cra_exit = cbcmac_exit_tfm;
+
+	inst->alg.init = crypto_cbcmac_digest_init;
+	inst->alg.update = crypto_cbcmac_digest_update;
+	inst->alg.finup = crypto_cbcmac_digest_finup;
+	inst->alg.setkey = crypto_cbcmac_digest_setkey;
+
+	inst->free = shash_free_singlespawn_instance;
+
+	err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+	if (err) {
+err_free_inst:
+		shash_free_singlespawn_instance(inst);
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_template crypto_ccm_tmpls[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "cbcmac",
+		.create = cbcmac_create,
+		.module = THIS_MODULE,
+	}, {
+		.name = "ccm_base",
+		.create = crypto_ccm_base_create,
+		.module = THIS_MODULE,
+	}, {
+		.name = "ccm",
+		.create = crypto_ccm_create,
+		.module = THIS_MODULE,
+	}, {
+		.name = "rfc4309",
+		.create = crypto_rfc4309_create,
+		.module = THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+};
+
+static int __init crypto_ccm_module_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_templates(crypto_ccm_tmpls,
+					 ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ccm_tmpls));
+}
+
+static void __exit crypto_ccm_module_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ccm_tmpls,
+				    ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ccm_tmpls));
+}
+
+module_init(crypto_ccm_module_init);
+module_exit(crypto_ccm_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Counter with CBC MAC");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm_base");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("rfc4309");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbcmac");
+MODULE_IMPORT_NS("CRYPTO_INTERNAL");