Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Don't destroy user event fields when removal fails

   User event fields are destroyed before the event is removed from
   visibility. But that can fail leaving the still visible event with no
   fields. Move the destroying of the fields to after the event is
   successfully removed from visibility.

 - Initialize function graph state is fork before calling
   copy_exec_state()

   For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new
   task_exec_state. If that allocation fails, ftrace_graph_exit_task()
   will free the tasks ret_stack pointer. Since that pointer is still
   using the parent's ret_stack, it mistakenly frees the parent's
   pointer too.

   Call ftrace_graph_init() on the task first which will NULL out the
   new tasks's ret_stack and if the copy fails, it will not free
   anything.

 - Remove FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX

   The macro FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX was added but never used. Remove it.

 - Save ent_size in function graph printing of nested functions

   The function graph tracer needs to look at the next event to see if
   the next event is the return of the current function entry. If it is,
   it prints a single line:

	ktime_get();

   Otherwise it prints it like a nested function:

	tick_nohz_irq_exit() {
	    ktime_get();
	    kcpustat_irq_exit();
	}

   In order to look at the next event, it must save the current event so
   that it has the information to print from it. It saves the event in
   the iterator descriptor called "ent". What it doesn't save is the
   ent_size of the event which is now used to know if the function graph
   arguments are to be printed. The peek doesn't save the size so the
   size used happens to be that of the size of the last event that was
   seen.

   Save the entry event size in the iterator descriptor so that the
   correct size is used.

 - Fix several errors with freeing data in the histogram code

   The histogram code had a lot of leaked or or incorrect accounting
   when failures happen. Correct them.

 - Fix histogram regression of .percent and .graph modifiers

   Up until 6.3 histogram values could have "percent" or "graph"
   modifiers that changed how they were printed. But a change that added
   restricting histograms values from being strings, stack traces and
   other modifiers inadvertently prevented them from using the percent
   and graph modifiers, which were legal use cases for values.

   Put back the percent and graph modifiers.

 - Fix various typos in the comments

 - Set the trace_clock before initializing a histogram with clock
   argument

   The histogram API allows the user to specific which trace clock to
   use via a "clock=" string. The histogram is set up first before the
   clock is checked. If the passed in clock is not valid, it exits
   without fully fixing up the histogram leaving it on the list and a
   use-after-free can trigger.

   Update the clock argument first and if it fails then exit gracefully
   before the histogram trigger is placed on any lists.

 - Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event

   The function ftrace_set_clr_event() modifies the parse string and
   needs to put it back to what was passed in. It searches for ":mod:"
   via a strsep() but fails to put back the first ':' in the string.

   Add back the ':' in the passed in string.

 - Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file

   The options files are dynamically created and some tracers add their
   own options. When a tracer adds their own list of options, the
   trace_array holding them has an array to hold the list of options for
   each tracer. This array increases in size via a krealloc(), and the
   new entry gets a newly allocated array to hold the options of the new
   tracer being added.

   The element in each entry of the tracer's option array holds a
   pointer back to the trace_array, a pointer to the tracer it is
   associated to, a pointer to the flags of the option.

   The issue is that these arrays are freed when the trace_array is
   freed when its instance it represents is removed from the instances
   directory. There's a race that an open of one of these options files
   can happen when the instance is being removed.

   Add a new helper function to be called by the open function of the
   options file to iterate all existing trace_arrays under a lock and
   find the one that has the given option element in one of it's tracer
   arrays. If found, then update the associated trace_array's reference
   counter to keep it from being freed. If not found, have the open call
   return -ENODEV.

 - Disable interrupts when acquiring the lock in rb_wake_up_waiters()

   The function rb_wake_up_waiters() assumes it will be called in
   interrupt context and does not disable irqs when taking
   cpu_buffer->reader_lock, which can be called in hard interrupt
   context. The issue is in PREEMPT_RT, this function is called in
   thread context leaving this lock open to a deadlock.

   Take the lock with interrupts disabled.

 - Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash

   The tmp_ops used in update_ftrace_direct_mod() assigns its
   filter_hash field directly, but that field is annotated as __rcu and
   sparse complains. Assign it with rcu_assign_pointer()

 - Fix use-after-free in enable_trigger_private_data_free()

   The trace_event_call is accessed through the event_trigger_data's
   trace_event_file pointer to put the trace_event_call on freeing. The
   issue is that the trace_event_file data may have been freed already
   causing a use-after-free. Add a field to the event_trigger_data that
   points directly to the trace_event_call so that it can decrement its
   reference directly without needing to go through the
   trace_event_file.

 - Fix accounting of buffer data remote headers

   trace_buffer_desc_size() and trace_remote_alloc_buffer() undercount
   the number of pages is needed for the asked for size as it doesn't
   take into account the meta data on each page. Add a helper function
   to do the calculation properly and use that in these functions.

 - Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing

   The number of pages per remote ring buffer is capped by
   ring_buffer_desc::nr_page_va (32 bits). A buffer_size large enough to
   overflow that field would silently allocate a descriptor smaller than
   what was asked for.

 - Do not resize the subbuf order if any per_cpu buffer is disabled

   The mmapping of ring buffers disables resizing the subbuffers, but it
   is done per-cpu whereas the subbuf size change is done for all the
   per_cpu buffers under the buffer->mutex. It could change the size of
   some while the mapping is happening on others. Have the resize of the
   subbuf order check all the per_cpu buffers under the lock to see if
   any of them is disabled before starting and causing an inconsistency
   between buffers that are being mapped.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: (25 commits)
  ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
  tracing/remotes: Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing
  tracing/remotes: Account for ring buffer page header in size calculation
  tracing: Don't dereference trace_event_file in deferred trigger free
  ftrace: Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash
  ring-buffer: Acquire the lock with irqsave in rb_wake_up_waiters()
  tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
  tracing: Fix ring_buffer_read_page_size() kernel-doc
  tracing: Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event()
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
  tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
  tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
  tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
  tracing: Fix typo "preceeded" in comment
  tracing: Fix typo "availabe" in comment
  tracing: Let histogram values keep the percent and graph modifiers
  tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
  tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
  tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
  ...

1 files changed, 1137 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/aes.c b/crypto/aes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..94791f481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/aes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1137 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Crypto API support for AES block cipher
+ *
+ * Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/aes-cbc-macs.h>
+#include <crypto/aes-cbc.h>
+#include <crypto/aes-ccm.h>
+#include <crypto/aes-ctr.h>
+#include <crypto/aes-ecb.h>
+#include <crypto/aes-gcm.h>
+#include <crypto/aes-xts.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+static_assert(__alignof__(struct aes_key) <= CRYPTO_MINALIGN);
+static_assert(__alignof__(struct aes_enckey) <= CRYPTO_MINALIGN);
+
+static int crypto_aes_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			     unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_key *key = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return aes_preparekey(key, in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static void crypto_aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	aes_encrypt(key, out, in);
+}
+
+static void crypto_aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	aes_decrypt(key, out, in);
+}
+
+static_assert(__alignof__(struct aes_cmac_key) <= CRYPTO_MINALIGN);
+#define AES_CMAC_KEY(tfm) ((struct aes_cmac_key *)crypto_shash_ctx(tfm))
+#define AES_CMAC_CTX(desc) ((struct aes_cmac_ctx *)shash_desc_ctx(desc))
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+						 const u8 *in_key,
+						 unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	return aes_cmac_preparekey(AES_CMAC_KEY(tfm), in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_xcbc_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+						 const u8 *in_key,
+						 unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	aes_xcbcmac_preparekey(AES_CMAC_KEY(tfm), in_key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cmac_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	aes_cmac_init(AES_CMAC_CTX(desc), AES_CMAC_KEY(desc->tfm));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cmac_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+						 const u8 *data,
+						 unsigned int len)
+{
+	aes_cmac_update(AES_CMAC_CTX(desc), data, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc,
+						u8 *out)
+{
+	aes_cmac_final(AES_CMAC_CTX(desc), out);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cmac_digest(struct shash_desc *desc,
+						 const u8 *data,
+						 unsigned int len, u8 *out)
+{
+	aes_cmac(AES_CMAC_KEY(desc->tfm), data, len, out);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define AES_CBCMAC_KEY(tfm) ((struct aes_enckey *)crypto_shash_ctx(tfm))
+#define AES_CBCMAC_CTX(desc) ((struct aes_cbcmac_ctx *)shash_desc_ctx(desc))
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cbcmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+						   const u8 *in_key,
+						   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	return aes_prepareenckey(AES_CBCMAC_KEY(tfm), in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cbcmac_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	aes_cbcmac_init(AES_CBCMAC_CTX(desc), AES_CBCMAC_KEY(desc->tfm));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cbcmac_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+						   const u8 *data,
+						   unsigned int len)
+{
+	aes_cbcmac_update(AES_CBCMAC_CTX(desc), data, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cbcmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc,
+						  u8 *out)
+{
+	aes_cbcmac_final(AES_CBCMAC_CTX(desc), out);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cbcmac_digest(struct shash_desc *desc,
+						   const u8 *data,
+						   unsigned int len, u8 *out)
+{
+	aes_cbcmac_init(AES_CBCMAC_CTX(desc), AES_CBCMAC_KEY(desc->tfm));
+	aes_cbcmac_update(AES_CBCMAC_CTX(desc), data, len);
+	aes_cbcmac_final(AES_CBCMAC_CTX(desc), out);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg alg = {
+	.cra_name = "aes",
+	.cra_driver_name = "aes-lib",
+	.cra_priority = 100,
+	.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_key),
+	.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_u = { .cipher = { .cia_min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			       .cia_max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			       .cia_setkey = crypto_aes_setkey,
+			       .cia_encrypt = crypto_aes_encrypt,
+			       .cia_decrypt = crypto_aes_decrypt } }
+};
+
+static struct shash_alg mac_algs[] = {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CMAC)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "cmac(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "cmac-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 300,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_cmac_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.digestsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_cmac_setkey,
+		.init = crypto_aes_cmac_init,
+		.update = crypto_aes_cmac_update,
+		.final = crypto_aes_cmac_final,
+		.digest = crypto_aes_cmac_digest,
+		.descsize = sizeof(struct aes_cmac_ctx),
+	},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCBC)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Note that the only difference between xcbc(aes) and cmac(aes)
+		 * is the preparekey function.
+		 */
+		.base.cra_name = "xcbc(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "xcbc-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 300,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_cmac_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.digestsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_xcbc_setkey,
+		.init = crypto_aes_cmac_init,
+		.update = crypto_aes_cmac_update,
+		.final = crypto_aes_cmac_final,
+		.digest = crypto_aes_cmac_digest,
+		.descsize = sizeof(struct aes_cmac_ctx),
+	},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "cbcmac(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "cbcmac-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 300,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_enckey),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.digestsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_cbcmac_setkey,
+		.init = crypto_aes_cbcmac_init,
+		.update = crypto_aes_cbcmac_update,
+		.final = crypto_aes_cbcmac_final,
+		.digest = crypto_aes_cbcmac_digest,
+		.descsize = sizeof(struct aes_cbcmac_ctx),
+	},
+#endif
+};
+
+static __maybe_unused int
+crypto_aes_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_key *key = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return aes_preparekey(key, in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int
+crypto_aes_skcipher_setenckey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			      unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_enckey *key = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return aes_prepareenckey(key, in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if the request uses only a single scatterlist element and high
+ * memory isn't enabled.  This assumes that both scatterlists are non-NULL, i.e.
+ * the caller must have handled the cryptlen == 0 case already.
+ */
+static inline bool
+skcipher_request_is_linear_lowmem(const struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HIGHMEM) &&
+	       req->dst->length >= req->cryptlen &&
+	       req->src->length >= req->cryptlen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call crypt_func() (a function that operates on simple virtual addresses) zero
+ * or more times to en/decrypt 'cryptlen' bytes of data from the source
+ * scatterlist 'src' and write it into the destination scatterlist 'dst',
+ * starting at 'start_pos' bytes into both.
+ *
+ * This always calls crypt_func() with a length that's a multiple of
+ * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, except the last call which includes any remainder.  This is
+ * implemented by using an on-stack bounce buffer when necessary.  The current
+ * implementation also tries to prefer passing at least 4 blocks, so e.g.
+ * scatterlist entries [16,16,16,16] result in a single 64-byte call.
+ *
+ * The scatterlists must describe either entirely different memory
+ * (out-of-place) or entirely the same memory (in-place).  In the latter case,
+ * crypt_func() is always called with the source and dest pointers the same.
+ */
+#define AES_CRYPT_SG(crypt_func, dst, src, cryptlen, start_pos, ...)           \
+	({                                                                     \
+		unsigned int remaining = (cryptlen);                           \
+		unsigned int spos = (start_pos);                               \
+                                                                               \
+		if (remaining != 0) {                                          \
+			struct scatter_walk dst_walk, src_walk;                \
+			u8 tmp[4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(                  \
+				__alignof__(long));                            \
+                                                                               \
+			scatterwalk_start_at_pos(&dst_walk, (dst), spos);      \
+			scatterwalk_start_at_pos(&src_walk, (src), spos);      \
+			do {                                                   \
+				unsigned int dst_avail = scatterwalk_clamp(    \
+					&dst_walk, remaining);                 \
+				unsigned int src_avail = scatterwalk_clamp(    \
+					&src_walk, remaining);                 \
+				unsigned int n = min(dst_avail, src_avail);    \
+				u8 *dst_virt;                                  \
+				const u8 *src_virt;                            \
+                                                                               \
+				if (n < remaining) {                           \
+					if (n < sizeof(tmp)) {                 \
+						n = min(remaining,             \
+							sizeof(tmp));          \
+						memcpy_from_scatterwalk(       \
+							tmp, &src_walk, n);    \
+						crypt_func(tmp, tmp, n,        \
+							   ##__VA_ARGS__);     \
+						memcpy_to_scatterwalk(         \
+							&dst_walk, tmp, n);    \
+						remaining -= n;                \
+						continue;                      \
+					}                                      \
+					n = round_down(n, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);     \
+				}                                              \
+                                                                               \
+				scatterwalk_map(&dst_walk);                    \
+				dst_virt = dst_walk.addr;                      \
+				if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HIGHMEM) &&              \
+				    offset_in_page(src_walk.offset) ==         \
+					    offset_in_page(dst_walk.offset) && \
+				    sg_page(src_walk.sg) + (src_walk.offset /  \
+							    PAGE_SIZE) ==      \
+					    sg_page(dst_walk.sg) +             \
+						    (dst_walk.offset /         \
+						     PAGE_SIZE)) {             \
+					src_virt = dst_virt;                   \
+				} else {                                       \
+					scatterwalk_map(&src_walk);            \
+					src_virt = src_walk.addr;              \
+				}                                              \
+				crypt_func(dst_virt, src_virt, n,              \
+					   ##__VA_ARGS__);                     \
+				if (src_virt != dst_virt)                      \
+					scatterwalk_unmap(&src_walk);          \
+				scatterwalk_advance(&src_walk, n);             \
+				scatterwalk_done_dst(&dst_walk, n);            \
+				remaining -= n;                                \
+			} while (remaining);                                   \
+			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));                    \
+		}                                                              \
+	})
+
+/*
+ * Call ad_func() as needed to process the associated data in the first
+ * 'assoclen' bytes of the scatterlist 'src'.
+ */
+#define AES_PROCESS_ASSOC_DATA(ad_func, src, assoclen, ctx)                 \
+	({                                                                  \
+		unsigned int remaining = (assoclen);                        \
+                                                                            \
+		if (remaining != 0) {                                       \
+			struct scatter_walk walk;                           \
+                                                                            \
+			scatterwalk_start(&walk, (src));                    \
+			do {                                                \
+				unsigned int n =                            \
+					scatterwalk_next(&walk, remaining); \
+                                                                            \
+				ad_func((ctx), walk.addr, n);               \
+				scatterwalk_done_src(&walk, n);             \
+				remaining -= n;                             \
+			} while (remaining);                                \
+		}                                                           \
+	})
+
+/* AES-ECB */
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_ecb_encrypt, req->dst, req->src, req->cryptlen, 0,
+		     key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_ecb_decrypt, req->dst, req->src, req->cryptlen, 0,
+		     key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* AES-CBC */
+
+static void crypto_aes_cbc_encrypt_sg(struct skcipher_request *req,
+				      unsigned int cryptlen,
+				      const struct aes_key *key)
+{
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_cbc_encrypt, req->dst, req->src, cryptlen, 0, req->iv,
+		     key);
+}
+
+static void crypto_aes_cbc_decrypt_sg(struct skcipher_request *req,
+				      unsigned int cryptlen,
+				      const struct aes_key *key)
+{
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_cbc_decrypt, req->dst, req->src, cryptlen, 0, req->iv,
+		     key);
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	crypto_aes_cbc_encrypt_sg(req, req->cryptlen, key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	crypto_aes_cbc_decrypt_sg(req, req->cryptlen, key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* AES-CBC-CTS */
+
+/*
+ * This handles AES-CBC-CTS en/decryption requests that use a nonlinear
+ * scatterlist layout or where HIGHMEM is enabled.  It is explicitly 'noinline'
+ * to keep the temporary buffer out of the stack frame of the fast path.
+ */
+static noinline int
+crypto_aes_cbc_cts_crypt_nonlinear(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+	unsigned int main_len = req->cryptlen;
+	unsigned int tail_len;
+	u8 tmp[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
+
+	if (main_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* Single block is a special case that just does CBC. */
+		if (enc)
+			crypto_aes_cbc_encrypt_sg(req, main_len, key);
+		else
+			crypto_aes_cbc_decrypt_sg(req, main_len, key);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Just do the last two blocks separately. */
+	tail_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE + ((main_len - 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + 1;
+	main_len -= tail_len;
+	if (enc)
+		crypto_aes_cbc_encrypt_sg(req, main_len, key);
+	else
+		crypto_aes_cbc_decrypt_sg(req, main_len, key);
+	memcpy_from_sglist(tmp, req->src, main_len, tail_len);
+	if (enc)
+		aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(tmp, tmp, tail_len, req->iv, key);
+	else
+		aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(tmp, tmp, tail_len, req->iv, key);
+	memcpy_to_sglist(req->dst, main_len, tmp, tail_len);
+	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int
+crypto_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (likely(skcipher_request_is_linear_lowmem(req))) {
+		/* Fast path */
+		aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(sg_virt(req->dst), sg_virt(req->src),
+				    req->cryptlen, req->iv, key);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return crypto_aes_cbc_cts_crypt_nonlinear(req, /* enc= */ true);
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int
+crypto_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (likely(skcipher_request_is_linear_lowmem(req))) {
+		/* Fast path */
+		aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(sg_virt(req->dst), sg_virt(req->src),
+				    req->cryptlen, req->iv, key);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return crypto_aes_cbc_cts_crypt_nonlinear(req, /* enc= */ false);
+}
+
+/* AES-CTR */
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ctr_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_enckey *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_ctr, req->dst, req->src, req->cryptlen, 0, req->iv,
+		     key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* AES-XCTR */
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_xctr_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_enckey *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+	u64 ctr = 1;
+
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_xctr, req->dst, req->src, req->cryptlen, 0, &ctr,
+		     req->iv, key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* AES-XTS */
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_xts_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
+						const u8 *in_key,
+						unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_xts_key *key = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int flags = (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+		     CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS) ?
+			    XTS_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS :
+			    0;
+
+	return aes_xts_preparekey(key, in_key, key_len, flags);
+}
+
+static void aes_xts_crypt_wrapper(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
+				  u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+				  const struct aes_xts_key *key, bool enc,
+				  bool *cont)
+{
+	if (enc)
+		aes_xts_encrypt(dst, src, len, iv, key, *cont);
+	else
+		aes_xts_decrypt(dst, src, len, iv, key, *cont);
+	*cont = true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This handles AES-XTS en/decryption requests that use a nonlinear scatterlist
+ * layout or where HIGHMEM is enabled.  It is explicitly 'noinline' to keep the
+ * temporary buffer out of the stack frame of the fast path.
+ */
+static noinline int crypto_aes_xts_crypt_nonlinear(struct skcipher_request *req,
+						   bool enc)
+{
+	const struct aes_xts_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+	u8 tmp[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
+	unsigned int main_len = req->cryptlen;
+	unsigned int tail_len = main_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	bool cont = false;
+
+	if (unlikely(tail_len)) {
+		/*
+		 * Ciphertext stealing is needed.
+		 * Just do the last two blocks separately.
+		 */
+		tail_len += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		main_len -= tail_len;
+	}
+
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_xts_crypt_wrapper, req->dst, req->src, main_len, 0,
+		     req->iv, key, enc, &cont);
+
+	if (unlikely(tail_len)) {
+		memcpy_from_sglist(tmp, req->src, main_len, tail_len);
+		aes_xts_crypt_wrapper(tmp, tmp, tail_len, req->iv, key, enc,
+				      &cont);
+		memcpy_to_sglist(req->dst, main_len, tmp, tail_len);
+		memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_xts_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (likely(skcipher_request_is_linear_lowmem(req))) {
+		/* Fast path */
+		aes_xts_encrypt(sg_virt(req->dst), sg_virt(req->src),
+				req->cryptlen, req->iv, key, /* cont= */ false);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return crypto_aes_xts_crypt_nonlinear(req, /* enc= */ true);
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_xts_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (likely(skcipher_request_is_linear_lowmem(req))) {
+		/* Fast path */
+		aes_xts_decrypt(sg_virt(req->dst), sg_virt(req->src),
+				req->cryptlen, req->iv, key, /* cont= */ false);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return crypto_aes_xts_crypt_nonlinear(req, /* enc= */ false);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg skcipher_algs[] = {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+		.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_skcipher_setkey,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_ecb_encrypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_ecb_decrypt,
+	},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "cbc(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+		.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_skcipher_setkey,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_cbc_encrypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_cbc_decrypt,
+	},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTS)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "cts(cbc(aes))",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "cts-cbc-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+		.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_skcipher_setkey,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt,
+	},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "ctr(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "ctr-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_enckey),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+		.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_skcipher_setenckey,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_ctr_crypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_ctr_crypt,
+	},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCTR)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "xctr(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "xctr-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_enckey),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+		.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_skcipher_setenckey,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_xctr_crypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_xctr_crypt,
+	},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "xts(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "xts-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_xts_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.min_keysize = 2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+		.max_keysize = 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_xts_setkey,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_xts_encrypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_xts_decrypt,
+	},
+#endif
+};
+
+/* AES-GCM */
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+						const u8 *in_key,
+						unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_gcm_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return aes_gcm_preparekey(key, in_key, key_len,
+				  crypto_aead_authsize(tfm));
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+						     unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct aes_gcm_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (crypto_gcm_check_authsize(authsize) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* Synchronize the tag length to the struct aes_gcm_key. */
+	key->authtag_len = authsize;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypto_aes_gcm_auth_update(struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx,
+				       struct scatterlist *src,
+				       unsigned int assoclen)
+{
+	AES_PROCESS_ASSOC_DATA(aes_gcm_auth_update, src, assoclen, ctx);
+}
+
+static void aes_gcm_encrypt_update_helper(u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+					  unsigned int len,
+					  struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	aes_gcm_encrypt_update(ctx, dst, src, len);
+}
+
+static void aes_gcm_decrypt_update_helper(u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+					  unsigned int len,
+					  struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	aes_gcm_decrypt_update(ctx, dst, src, len);
+}
+
+static int crypto_aes_gcm_encrypt_common(struct aead_request *req,
+					 const struct aes_gcm_key *key,
+					 u8 iv[12], unsigned int assoclen)
+{
+	struct aes_gcm_ctx ctx;
+	u8 authtag[16];
+
+	aes_gcm_init(&ctx, iv, key);
+	crypto_aes_gcm_auth_update(&ctx, req->src, assoclen);
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_gcm_encrypt_update_helper, req->dst, req->src,
+		     req->cryptlen, req->assoclen, &ctx);
+	aes_gcm_encrypt_final(&ctx, authtag);
+	memcpy_to_sglist(req->dst, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, authtag,
+			 key->authtag_len);
+	memzero_explicit(authtag, sizeof(authtag));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_aes_gcm_decrypt_common(struct aead_request *req,
+					 const struct aes_gcm_key *key,
+					 u8 iv[12], unsigned int assoclen)
+{
+	struct aes_gcm_ctx ctx;
+	unsigned int data_len;
+	u8 authtag[16];
+	int err;
+
+	aes_gcm_init(&ctx, iv, key);
+	crypto_aes_gcm_auth_update(&ctx, req->src, assoclen);
+
+	/* crypto_aead_decrypt() already checked cryptlen >= authtag_len. */
+	data_len = req->cryptlen - key->authtag_len;
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_gcm_decrypt_update_helper, req->dst, req->src,
+		     data_len, req->assoclen, &ctx);
+
+	memcpy_from_sglist(authtag, req->src, req->assoclen + data_len,
+			   key->authtag_len);
+	err = aes_gcm_decrypt_final(&ctx, authtag);
+	memzero_explicit(authtag, sizeof(authtag));
+	return err;
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct aes_gcm_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return crypto_aes_gcm_encrypt_common(req, key, req->iv, req->assoclen);
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct aes_gcm_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return crypto_aes_gcm_decrypt_common(req, key, req->iv, req->assoclen);
+}
+
+struct aes_rfc4106_key {
+	struct aes_gcm_key gcm;
+	u8 nonce[4];
+};
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_rfc4106_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+						    const u8 *in_key,
+						    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_rfc4106_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (key_len < 4)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key_len -= 4;
+	memcpy(key->nonce, in_key + key_len, 4);
+
+	return aes_gcm_preparekey(&key->gcm, in_key, key_len,
+				  crypto_aead_authsize(tfm));
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int
+crypto_aes_rfc4106_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct aes_rfc4106_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (crypto_rfc4106_check_authsize(authsize) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Synchronize the tag length to the struct aes_gcm_key. */
+	key->gcm.authtag_len = authsize;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct aes_rfc4106_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 iv[12];
+
+	if (crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(iv, key->nonce, 4);
+	memcpy(&iv[4], req->iv, 8);
+
+	return crypto_aes_gcm_encrypt_common(req, &key->gcm, iv,
+					     req->assoclen - 8);
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct aes_rfc4106_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 iv[12];
+
+	if (crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(iv, key->nonce, 4);
+	memcpy(&iv[4], req->iv, 8);
+
+	return crypto_aes_gcm_decrypt_common(req, &key->gcm, iv,
+					     req->assoclen - 8);
+}
+
+/* AES-CCM */
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+						const u8 *in_key,
+						unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_ccm_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return aes_ccm_preparekey(key, in_key, key_len,
+				  crypto_aead_authsize(tfm));
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+						     unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct aes_ccm_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (authsize < 4 || authsize > 16 || authsize % 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* Synchronize the tag length to the struct aes_ccm_key. */
+	key->authtag_len = authsize;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_aes_ccm_init(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx,
+			       struct aead_request *req, unsigned int data_len,
+			       const struct aes_ccm_key *key)
+{
+	int nonce_len;
+	const u8 *nonce;
+	int err;
+
+	/*
+	 * CCM accepts a variable-length nonce between 7 and 13 bytes
+	 * inclusively, while crypto_aead assumes a fixed-length IV.  This is
+	 * worked around by requiring that iv[0] contain '14 - nonce_len' and
+	 * iv[1..] contain the actual nonce.  Extra bytes at the end are unused.
+	 */
+	nonce_len = 14 - (int)req->iv[0];
+	if (unlikely(nonce_len < 7 || nonce_len > 13))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	nonce = &req->iv[1];
+	err = aes_ccm_init(ctx, data_len, req->assoclen, nonce, nonce_len, key);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
+	AES_PROCESS_ASSOC_DATA(aes_ccm_auth_update, req->src, req->assoclen,
+			       ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void aes_ccm_encrypt_update_helper(u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+					  unsigned int len,
+					  struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	aes_ccm_encrypt_update(ctx, dst, src, len);
+}
+
+static void aes_ccm_decrypt_update_helper(u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+					  unsigned int len,
+					  struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	aes_ccm_decrypt_update(ctx, dst, src, len);
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct aes_ccm_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aes_ccm_ctx ctx;
+	u8 authtag[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_aes_ccm_init(&ctx, req, req->cryptlen, key);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_ccm_encrypt_update_helper, req->dst, req->src,
+		     req->cryptlen, req->assoclen, &ctx);
+	aes_ccm_encrypt_final(&ctx, authtag);
+	memcpy_to_sglist(req->dst, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, authtag,
+			 key->authtag_len);
+	memzero_explicit(authtag, sizeof(authtag));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct aes_ccm_key *key = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned int data_len;
+	struct aes_ccm_ctx ctx;
+	u8 authtag[16];
+	int err;
+
+	/* crypto_aead_decrypt() already checked cryptlen >= authtag_len. */
+	data_len = req->cryptlen - key->authtag_len;
+	err = crypto_aes_ccm_init(&ctx, req, data_len, key);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_ccm_decrypt_update_helper, req->dst, req->src,
+		     data_len, req->assoclen, &ctx);
+	memcpy_from_sglist(authtag, req->src, req->assoclen + data_len,
+			   key->authtag_len);
+	err = aes_ccm_decrypt_final(&ctx, authtag);
+	memzero_explicit(authtag, sizeof(authtag));
+	return err;
+}
+
+static struct aead_alg aead_algs[] = {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "gcm(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "gcm-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_gcm_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_gcm_setkey,
+		.setauthsize = crypto_aes_gcm_setauthsize,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_gcm_encrypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_gcm_decrypt,
+		.ivsize = GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
+		.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	},
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "rfc4106-gcm-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_rfc4106_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_rfc4106_setkey,
+		.setauthsize = crypto_aes_rfc4106_setauthsize,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_rfc4106_encrypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_rfc4106_decrypt,
+		.ivsize = GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE,
+		.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	},
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "ccm(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "ccm-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_ccm_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_ccm_setkey,
+		.setauthsize = crypto_aes_ccm_setauthsize,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt,
+		.ivsize = 16,
+		.maxauthsize = 16,
+		.chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	},
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM */
+};
+
+static int __init crypto_aes_mod_init(void)
+{
+	int err = crypto_register_alg(&alg);
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs) > 0) {
+		err = crypto_register_shashes(mac_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs));
+		if (err)
+			goto err_unregister_alg;
+	} /* Else, CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH might not be enabled. */
+
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs) > 0) {
+		err = crypto_register_skciphers(skcipher_algs,
+						ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs));
+		if (err)
+			goto err_unregister_macs;
+	}
+
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(aead_algs) > 0) {
+		err = crypto_register_aeads(aead_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(aead_algs));
+		if (err)
+			goto err_unregister_skciphers;
+	} /* Else, CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD might not be enabled. */
+	return 0;
+
+err_unregister_skciphers:
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs) > 0)
+		crypto_unregister_skciphers(skcipher_algs,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs));
+err_unregister_macs:
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs) > 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shashes(mac_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs));
+err_unregister_alg:
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
+	return err;
+}
+module_init(crypto_aes_mod_init);
+
+static void __exit crypto_aes_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(aead_algs) > 0)
+		crypto_unregister_aeads(aead_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(aead_algs));
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs) > 0)
+		crypto_unregister_skciphers(skcipher_algs,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs));
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs) > 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shashes(mac_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs));
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
+}
+module_exit(crypto_aes_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Crypto API support for AES block cipher");
+MODULE_IMPORT_NS("CRYPTO_INTERNAL");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes-lib");
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CMAC)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cmac(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cmac-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCBC)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xcbc(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xcbc-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbcmac(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbcmac-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecb(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecb-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbc(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbc-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTS)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cts(cbc(aes))");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cts-cbc-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ctr(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ctr-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCTR)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xctr(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xctr-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("gcm(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("gcm-aes-lib");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("rfc4106(gcm(aes))");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("rfc4106-gcm-aes-lib");
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm-aes-lib");
+#endif