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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /block/partitions/sysv68.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'block/partitions/sysv68.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | block/partitions/sysv68.c | 92 |
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/block/partitions/sysv68.c b/block/partitions/sysv68.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..470e0f9de --- /dev/null +++ b/block/partitions/sysv68.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * fs/partitions/sysv68.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2007 Philippe De Muyter <phdm@macqel.be> + */ + +#include "check.h" + +/* + * Volume ID structure: on first 256-bytes sector of disk + */ + +struct volumeid { + u8 vid_unused[248]; + u8 vid_mac[8]; /* ASCII string "MOTOROLA" */ +}; + +/* + * config block: second 256-bytes sector on disk + */ + +struct dkconfig { + u8 ios_unused0[128]; + __be32 ios_slcblk; /* Slice table block number */ + __be16 ios_slccnt; /* Number of entries in slice table */ + u8 ios_unused1[122]; +}; + +/* + * combined volumeid and dkconfig block + */ + +struct dkblk0 { + struct volumeid dk_vid; + struct dkconfig dk_ios; +}; + +/* + * Slice Table Structure + */ + +struct slice { + __be32 nblocks; /* slice size (in blocks) */ + __be32 blkoff; /* block offset of slice */ +}; + + +int sysv68_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state) +{ + int i, slices; + int slot = 1; + Sector sect; + unsigned char *data; + struct dkblk0 *b; + struct slice *slice; + + data = read_part_sector(state, 0, §); + if (!data) + return -1; + + b = (struct dkblk0 *)data; + if (memcmp(b->dk_vid.vid_mac, "MOTOROLA", sizeof(b->dk_vid.vid_mac))) { + put_dev_sector(sect); + return 0; + } + slices = be16_to_cpu(b->dk_ios.ios_slccnt); + i = be32_to_cpu(b->dk_ios.ios_slcblk); + put_dev_sector(sect); + + data = read_part_sector(state, i, §); + if (!data) + return -1; + + slices -= 1; /* last slice is the whole disk */ + seq_buf_printf(&state->pp_buf, "sysV68: %s(s%u)", state->name, slices); + slice = (struct slice *)data; + for (i = 0; i < slices; i++, slice++) { + if (slot == state->limit) + break; + if (be32_to_cpu(slice->nblocks)) { + put_partition(state, slot, + be32_to_cpu(slice->blkoff), + be32_to_cpu(slice->nblocks)); + seq_buf_printf(&state->pp_buf, "(s%u)", i); + } + slot++; + } + seq_buf_puts(&state->pp_buf, "\n"); + put_dev_sector(sect); + return 1; +} |
