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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /block/partitions/sysv68.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'block/partitions/sysv68.c')
-rw-r--r--block/partitions/sysv68.c92
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/block/partitions/sysv68.c b/block/partitions/sysv68.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..470e0f9de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/block/partitions/sysv68.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * fs/partitions/sysv68.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Philippe De Muyter <phdm@macqel.be>
+ */
+
+#include "check.h"
+
+/*
+ * Volume ID structure: on first 256-bytes sector of disk
+ */
+
+struct volumeid {
+ u8 vid_unused[248];
+ u8 vid_mac[8]; /* ASCII string "MOTOROLA" */
+};
+
+/*
+ * config block: second 256-bytes sector on disk
+ */
+
+struct dkconfig {
+ u8 ios_unused0[128];
+ __be32 ios_slcblk; /* Slice table block number */
+ __be16 ios_slccnt; /* Number of entries in slice table */
+ u8 ios_unused1[122];
+};
+
+/*
+ * combined volumeid and dkconfig block
+ */
+
+struct dkblk0 {
+ struct volumeid dk_vid;
+ struct dkconfig dk_ios;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Slice Table Structure
+ */
+
+struct slice {
+ __be32 nblocks; /* slice size (in blocks) */
+ __be32 blkoff; /* block offset of slice */
+};
+
+
+int sysv68_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state)
+{
+ int i, slices;
+ int slot = 1;
+ Sector sect;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ struct dkblk0 *b;
+ struct slice *slice;
+
+ data = read_part_sector(state, 0, &sect);
+ if (!data)
+ return -1;
+
+ b = (struct dkblk0 *)data;
+ if (memcmp(b->dk_vid.vid_mac, "MOTOROLA", sizeof(b->dk_vid.vid_mac))) {
+ put_dev_sector(sect);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ slices = be16_to_cpu(b->dk_ios.ios_slccnt);
+ i = be32_to_cpu(b->dk_ios.ios_slcblk);
+ put_dev_sector(sect);
+
+ data = read_part_sector(state, i, &sect);
+ if (!data)
+ return -1;
+
+ slices -= 1; /* last slice is the whole disk */
+ seq_buf_printf(&state->pp_buf, "sysV68: %s(s%u)", state->name, slices);
+ slice = (struct slice *)data;
+ for (i = 0; i < slices; i++, slice++) {
+ if (slot == state->limit)
+ break;
+ if (be32_to_cpu(slice->nblocks)) {
+ put_partition(state, slot,
+ be32_to_cpu(slice->blkoff),
+ be32_to_cpu(slice->nblocks));
+ seq_buf_printf(&state->pp_buf, "(s%u)", i);
+ }
+ slot++;
+ }
+ seq_buf_puts(&state->pp_buf, "\n");
+ put_dev_sector(sect);
+ return 1;
+}