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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /block/partitions/sysv68.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'block/partitions/sysv68.c')
-rw-r--r--block/partitions/sysv68.c92
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/block/partitions/sysv68.c b/block/partitions/sysv68.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..470e0f9de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/block/partitions/sysv68.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * fs/partitions/sysv68.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Philippe De Muyter <phdm@macqel.be>
+ */
+
+#include "check.h"
+
+/*
+ * Volume ID structure: on first 256-bytes sector of disk
+ */
+
+struct volumeid {
+ u8 vid_unused[248];
+ u8 vid_mac[8]; /* ASCII string "MOTOROLA" */
+};
+
+/*
+ * config block: second 256-bytes sector on disk
+ */
+
+struct dkconfig {
+ u8 ios_unused0[128];
+ __be32 ios_slcblk; /* Slice table block number */
+ __be16 ios_slccnt; /* Number of entries in slice table */
+ u8 ios_unused1[122];
+};
+
+/*
+ * combined volumeid and dkconfig block
+ */
+
+struct dkblk0 {
+ struct volumeid dk_vid;
+ struct dkconfig dk_ios;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Slice Table Structure
+ */
+
+struct slice {
+ __be32 nblocks; /* slice size (in blocks) */
+ __be32 blkoff; /* block offset of slice */
+};
+
+
+int sysv68_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state)
+{
+ int i, slices;
+ int slot = 1;
+ Sector sect;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ struct dkblk0 *b;
+ struct slice *slice;
+
+ data = read_part_sector(state, 0, &sect);
+ if (!data)
+ return -1;
+
+ b = (struct dkblk0 *)data;
+ if (memcmp(b->dk_vid.vid_mac, "MOTOROLA", sizeof(b->dk_vid.vid_mac))) {
+ put_dev_sector(sect);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ slices = be16_to_cpu(b->dk_ios.ios_slccnt);
+ i = be32_to_cpu(b->dk_ios.ios_slcblk);
+ put_dev_sector(sect);
+
+ data = read_part_sector(state, i, &sect);
+ if (!data)
+ return -1;
+
+ slices -= 1; /* last slice is the whole disk */
+ seq_buf_printf(&state->pp_buf, "sysV68: %s(s%u)", state->name, slices);
+ slice = (struct slice *)data;
+ for (i = 0; i < slices; i++, slice++) {
+ if (slot == state->limit)
+ break;
+ if (be32_to_cpu(slice->nblocks)) {
+ put_partition(state, slot,
+ be32_to_cpu(slice->blkoff),
+ be32_to_cpu(slice->nblocks));
+ seq_buf_printf(&state->pp_buf, "(s%u)", i);
+ }
+ slot++;
+ }
+ seq_buf_puts(&state->pp_buf, "\n");
+ put_dev_sector(sect);
+ return 1;
+}