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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /block/partitions/sysv68.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'block/partitions/sysv68.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | block/partitions/sysv68.c | 92 |
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/block/partitions/sysv68.c b/block/partitions/sysv68.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..470e0f9de --- /dev/null +++ b/block/partitions/sysv68.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * fs/partitions/sysv68.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2007 Philippe De Muyter <phdm@macqel.be> + */ + +#include "check.h" + +/* + * Volume ID structure: on first 256-bytes sector of disk + */ + +struct volumeid { + u8 vid_unused[248]; + u8 vid_mac[8]; /* ASCII string "MOTOROLA" */ +}; + +/* + * config block: second 256-bytes sector on disk + */ + +struct dkconfig { + u8 ios_unused0[128]; + __be32 ios_slcblk; /* Slice table block number */ + __be16 ios_slccnt; /* Number of entries in slice table */ + u8 ios_unused1[122]; +}; + +/* + * combined volumeid and dkconfig block + */ + +struct dkblk0 { + struct volumeid dk_vid; + struct dkconfig dk_ios; +}; + +/* + * Slice Table Structure + */ + +struct slice { + __be32 nblocks; /* slice size (in blocks) */ + __be32 blkoff; /* block offset of slice */ +}; + + +int sysv68_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state) +{ + int i, slices; + int slot = 1; + Sector sect; + unsigned char *data; + struct dkblk0 *b; + struct slice *slice; + + data = read_part_sector(state, 0, §); + if (!data) + return -1; + + b = (struct dkblk0 *)data; + if (memcmp(b->dk_vid.vid_mac, "MOTOROLA", sizeof(b->dk_vid.vid_mac))) { + put_dev_sector(sect); + return 0; + } + slices = be16_to_cpu(b->dk_ios.ios_slccnt); + i = be32_to_cpu(b->dk_ios.ios_slcblk); + put_dev_sector(sect); + + data = read_part_sector(state, i, §); + if (!data) + return -1; + + slices -= 1; /* last slice is the whole disk */ + seq_buf_printf(&state->pp_buf, "sysV68: %s(s%u)", state->name, slices); + slice = (struct slice *)data; + for (i = 0; i < slices; i++, slice++) { + if (slot == state->limit) + break; + if (be32_to_cpu(slice->nblocks)) { + put_partition(state, slot, + be32_to_cpu(slice->blkoff), + be32_to_cpu(slice->nblocks)); + seq_buf_printf(&state->pp_buf, "(s%u)", i); + } + slot++; + } + seq_buf_puts(&state->pp_buf, "\n"); + put_dev_sector(sect); + return 1; +} |
