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authorKees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>2026-09-02 15:31:14 -0700
committerKees Cook <kees@kernel.org>2026-09-04 21:37:00 -0700
commit3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d (patch)
treec65086f9bdcd48c6360fb7cb4598bca084da1f32 /arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c
downloadlinux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.tar.gz
linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.zip
treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversionsgrafted
This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc() family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's "--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control flow indicator I could find. Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc, riscv, and s390 with no new warnings. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1] Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c63
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc1afd5c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+static pgprot_t protection_map[16] __ro_after_init = {
+ [VM_NONE] = PAGE_NONE,
+ [VM_READ] = PAGE_READONLY,
+ [VM_WRITE] = PAGE_COPY,
+ [VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_COPY,
+ [VM_EXEC] = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
+ [VM_EXEC | VM_READ] = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
+ [VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE] = PAGE_COPY_EXEC,
+ [VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_COPY_EXEC,
+ [VM_SHARED] = PAGE_NONE,
+ [VM_SHARED | VM_READ] = PAGE_READONLY,
+ [VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE] = PAGE_SHARED,
+ [VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_SHARED,
+ [VM_SHARED | VM_EXEC] = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
+ [VM_SHARED | VM_EXEC | VM_READ] = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
+ [VM_SHARED | VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE] = PAGE_SHARED_EXEC,
+ [VM_SHARED | VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
+};
+
+void add_encrypt_protection_map(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
+ protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
+}
+
+pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+ unsigned long val = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
+ (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ /*
+ * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags value and
+ * turn them in to the bits that we can put in to a pte.
+ *
+ * Only override these if Protection Keys are available (which is only
+ * on 64-bit).
+ */
+ if (vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT0)
+ val |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0;
+ if (vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT1)
+ val |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1;
+ if (vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT2)
+ val |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2;
+ if (vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT3)
+ val |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3;
+#endif
+
+ val = __sme_set(val);
+ if (val & _PAGE_PRESENT)
+ val &= __supported_pte_mask;
+ return __pgprot(val);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_get_page_prot);