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| author | Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org> | 2026-09-02 15:31:14 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> | 2026-09-04 21:37:00 -0700 |
| commit | 3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d (patch) | |
| tree | c65086f9bdcd48c6360fb7cb4598bca084da1f32 /arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c | |
| download | linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.tar.gz linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.zip | |
treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversionsgrafted
This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc()
family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci
This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first
kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the
first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h
scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's
"--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped
to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control
flow indicator I could find.
Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc,
riscv, and s390 with no new warnings.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1]
Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c | 63 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dc1afd5c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <asm/pgtable.h> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h> + +static pgprot_t protection_map[16] __ro_after_init = { + [VM_NONE] = PAGE_NONE, + [VM_READ] = PAGE_READONLY, + [VM_WRITE] = PAGE_COPY, + [VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_COPY, + [VM_EXEC] = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC, + [VM_EXEC | VM_READ] = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC, + [VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE] = PAGE_COPY_EXEC, + [VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_COPY_EXEC, + [VM_SHARED] = PAGE_NONE, + [VM_SHARED | VM_READ] = PAGE_READONLY, + [VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE] = PAGE_SHARED, + [VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_SHARED, + [VM_SHARED | VM_EXEC] = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC, + [VM_SHARED | VM_EXEC | VM_READ] = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC, + [VM_SHARED | VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE] = PAGE_SHARED_EXEC, + [VM_SHARED | VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_SHARED_EXEC +}; + +void add_encrypt_protection_map(void) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++) + protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]); +} + +pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ + unsigned long val = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags & + (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]); + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS + /* + * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags value and + * turn them in to the bits that we can put in to a pte. + * + * Only override these if Protection Keys are available (which is only + * on 64-bit). + */ + if (vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT0) + val |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0; + if (vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT1) + val |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1; + if (vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT2) + val |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2; + if (vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT3) + val |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3; +#endif + + val = __sme_set(val); + if (val & _PAGE_PRESENT) + val &= __supported_pte_mask; + return __pgprot(val); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_get_page_prot); |
