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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c55
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24b48af27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * User address space access functions.
+ *
+ * For licencing details see kernel-base/COPYING
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/instrumented.h>
+
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+
+/**
+ * copy_from_user_nmi - NMI safe copy from user
+ * @to: Pointer to the destination buffer
+ * @from: Pointer to a user space address of the current task
+ * @n: Number of bytes to copy
+ *
+ * Returns: The number of not copied bytes. 0 is success, i.e. all bytes copied
+ *
+ * Contrary to other copy_from_user() variants this function can be called
+ * from NMI context. Despite the name it is not restricted to be called
+ * from NMI context. It is safe to be called from any other context as
+ * well. It disables pagefaults across the copy which means a fault will
+ * abort the copy.
+ *
+ * For NMI context invocations this relies on the nested NMI work to allow
+ * atomic faults from the NMI path; the nested NMI paths are careful to
+ * preserve CR2.
+ */
+unsigned long
+copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
+{
+ unsigned long ret;
+
+ if (!__access_ok(from, n))
+ return n;
+
+ if (!nmi_uaccess_okay())
+ return n;
+
+ /*
+ * Even though this function is typically called from NMI/IRQ context
+ * disable pagefaults so that its behaviour is consistent even when
+ * called from other contexts.
+ */
+ pagefault_disable();
+ instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
+ ret = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, ret);
+ pagefault_enable();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_from_user_nmi);