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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/lib/putuser.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 156 |
1 files changed, 156 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..46d9e9b98 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * __put_user functions. + * + * (C) Copyright 2005 Linus Torvalds + * (C) Copyright 2005 Andi Kleen + * (C) Copyright 2008 Glauber Costa + * + * These functions have a non-standard call interface + * to make them more efficient, especially as they + * return an error value in addition to the "real" + * return value. + */ +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/objtool.h> +#include <asm/thread_info.h> +#include <asm/errno.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/smap.h> + +/* + * __put_user_X + * + * Inputs: %eax[:%edx] contains the data + * %ecx contains the address + * + * Outputs: %ecx is error code (0 or -EFAULT) + * + * Clobbers: %ebx needed for task pointer + * + * These functions should not modify any other registers, + * as they get called from within inline assembly. + */ + +.macro check_range size:req +.if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) + mov %rcx, %rbx + sar $63, %rbx + or %rbx, %rcx +.else + cmp $TASK_SIZE_MAX-\size+1, %ecx + jae .Lbad_put_user +.endif +.endm + +.text +SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_1) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + check_range size=1 + ASM_STAC +1: movb %al,(%_ASM_CX) + xor %ecx,%ecx + ASM_CLAC + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_1) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_1) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_nocheck_1) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ASM_STAC +2: movb %al,(%_ASM_CX) + xor %ecx,%ecx + ASM_CLAC + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_1) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_1) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_2) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + check_range size=2 + ASM_STAC +3: movw %ax,(%_ASM_CX) + xor %ecx,%ecx + ASM_CLAC + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_2) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_2) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_nocheck_2) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ASM_STAC +4: movw %ax,(%_ASM_CX) + xor %ecx,%ecx + ASM_CLAC + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_2) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_2) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_4) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + check_range size=4 + ASM_STAC +5: movl %eax,(%_ASM_CX) + xor %ecx,%ecx + ASM_CLAC + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_4) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_4) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_nocheck_4) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ASM_STAC +6: movl %eax,(%_ASM_CX) + xor %ecx,%ecx + ASM_CLAC + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_4) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_4) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_8) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + check_range size=8 + ASM_STAC +7: mov %_ASM_AX,(%_ASM_CX) +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +8: movl %edx,4(%_ASM_CX) +#endif + xor %ecx,%ecx + ASM_CLAC + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_8) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_8) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_nocheck_8) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ASM_STAC +9: mov %_ASM_AX,(%_ASM_CX) +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +10: movl %edx,4(%_ASM_CX) +#endif + xor %ecx,%ecx + ASM_CLAC + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_8) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_8) + +SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(__put_user_handle_exception) + ASM_CLAC +.Lbad_put_user: + movl $-EFAULT,%ecx + RET +SYM_CODE_END(__put_user_handle_exception) + + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, __put_user_handle_exception) + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(2b, __put_user_handle_exception) + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(3b, __put_user_handle_exception) + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(4b, __put_user_handle_exception) + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(5b, __put_user_handle_exception) + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(6b, __put_user_handle_exception) + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(7b, __put_user_handle_exception) + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(9b, __put_user_handle_exception) +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(8b, __put_user_handle_exception) + _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(10b, __put_user_handle_exception) +#endif |
