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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/lib/putuser.S')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/putuser.S156
1 files changed, 156 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..46d9e9b98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * __put_user functions.
+ *
+ * (C) Copyright 2005 Linus Torvalds
+ * (C) Copyright 2005 Andi Kleen
+ * (C) Copyright 2008 Glauber Costa
+ *
+ * These functions have a non-standard call interface
+ * to make them more efficient, especially as they
+ * return an error value in addition to the "real"
+ * return value.
+ */
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/objtool.h>
+#include <asm/thread_info.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/smap.h>
+
+/*
+ * __put_user_X
+ *
+ * Inputs: %eax[:%edx] contains the data
+ * %ecx contains the address
+ *
+ * Outputs: %ecx is error code (0 or -EFAULT)
+ *
+ * Clobbers: %ebx needed for task pointer
+ *
+ * These functions should not modify any other registers,
+ * as they get called from within inline assembly.
+ */
+
+.macro check_range size:req
+.if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)
+ mov %rcx, %rbx
+ sar $63, %rbx
+ or %rbx, %rcx
+.else
+ cmp $TASK_SIZE_MAX-\size+1, %ecx
+ jae .Lbad_put_user
+.endif
+.endm
+
+.text
+SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_1)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ check_range size=1
+ ASM_STAC
+1: movb %al,(%_ASM_CX)
+ xor %ecx,%ecx
+ ASM_CLAC
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_1)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_1)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_nocheck_1)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ ASM_STAC
+2: movb %al,(%_ASM_CX)
+ xor %ecx,%ecx
+ ASM_CLAC
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_1)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_1)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_2)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ check_range size=2
+ ASM_STAC
+3: movw %ax,(%_ASM_CX)
+ xor %ecx,%ecx
+ ASM_CLAC
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_2)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_2)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_nocheck_2)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ ASM_STAC
+4: movw %ax,(%_ASM_CX)
+ xor %ecx,%ecx
+ ASM_CLAC
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_2)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_2)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_4)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ check_range size=4
+ ASM_STAC
+5: movl %eax,(%_ASM_CX)
+ xor %ecx,%ecx
+ ASM_CLAC
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_4)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_4)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_nocheck_4)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ ASM_STAC
+6: movl %eax,(%_ASM_CX)
+ xor %ecx,%ecx
+ ASM_CLAC
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_4)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_4)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_8)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ check_range size=8
+ ASM_STAC
+7: mov %_ASM_AX,(%_ASM_CX)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+8: movl %edx,4(%_ASM_CX)
+#endif
+ xor %ecx,%ecx
+ ASM_CLAC
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_8)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_8)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_nocheck_8)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ ASM_STAC
+9: mov %_ASM_AX,(%_ASM_CX)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+10: movl %edx,4(%_ASM_CX)
+#endif
+ xor %ecx,%ecx
+ ASM_CLAC
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_8)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_8)
+
+SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(__put_user_handle_exception)
+ ASM_CLAC
+.Lbad_put_user:
+ movl $-EFAULT,%ecx
+ RET
+SYM_CODE_END(__put_user_handle_exception)
+
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(2b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(3b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(4b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(5b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(6b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(7b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(9b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(8b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(10b, __put_user_handle_exception)
+#endif