summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/boot/setup.ld')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/setup.ld74
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld b/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e1d594a60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * setup.ld
+ *
+ * Linker script for the i386 setup code
+ */
+OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386")
+OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
+ENTRY(_start)
+
+SECTIONS
+{
+ . = 0;
+ .bstext : {
+ *(.bstext)
+ . = 495;
+ } =0xffffffff
+
+ .header : { *(.header) }
+ .entrytext : { *(.entrytext) }
+ .inittext : { *(.inittext) }
+ .initdata : { *(.initdata) }
+ __end_init = .;
+
+ .text : { *(.text .text.*) }
+ .text32 : { *(.text32) }
+
+ .pecompat : { *(.pecompat) }
+ PROVIDE(pecompat_fsize = setup_size - pecompat_fstart);
+
+ . = ALIGN(16);
+ .rodata : { *(.rodata*) }
+
+ .videocards : {
+ video_cards = .;
+ *(.videocards)
+ video_cards_end = .;
+ }
+
+ . = ALIGN(16);
+ .data : { *(.data*) }
+
+ .signature : {
+ setup_sig = .;
+ LONG(0x5a5aaa55)
+
+ setup_size = ALIGN(ABSOLUTE(.), 4096);
+ setup_sects = ABSOLUTE(setup_size / 512);
+ ASSERT(setup_sects >= 5, "The setup must be at least 5 sectors in size");
+ ASSERT(setup_sects <= 64, "The setup must be at most 64 sectors in size");
+ }
+
+ . = ALIGN(16);
+ .bss :
+ {
+ __bss_start = .;
+ *(.bss)
+ __bss_end = .;
+ }
+ . = ALIGN(16);
+ _end = .;
+
+ /DISCARD/ : {
+ *(.note*)
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The ASSERT() sink to . is intentional, for binutils 2.14 compatibility:
+ */
+ . = ASSERT(_end <= 0x8000, "Setup too big!");
+ . = ASSERT(hdr == 0x1f1, "The setup header has the wrong offset!");
+ /* Necessary for the very-old-loader check to work... */
+ . = ASSERT(__end_init <= 5*512, "init sections too big!");
+
+}