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| author | Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org> | 2026-09-02 15:31:14 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> | 2026-09-04 21:37:00 -0700 |
| commit | 3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d (patch) | |
| tree | c65086f9bdcd48c6360fb7cb4598bca084da1f32 /arch/x86/boot/pmjump.S | |
| download | linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.tar.gz linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.zip | |
treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversionsgrafted
This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc()
family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci
This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first
kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the
first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h
scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's
"--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped
to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control
flow indicator I could find.
Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc,
riscv, and s390 with no new warnings.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1]
Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/boot/pmjump.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/boot/pmjump.S | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/pmjump.S b/arch/x86/boot/pmjump.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cbec8bd08 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/boot/pmjump.S @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- * + * + * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds + * Copyright 2007 rPath, Inc. - All Rights Reserved + * + * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* + * The actual transition into protected mode + */ + +#include <asm/boot.h> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h> +#include <asm/segment.h> +#include <linux/linkage.h> + + .text + .code16 + +/* + * void protected_mode_jump(u32 entrypoint, u32 bootparams); + */ +SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(protected_mode_jump) + movl %edx, %esi # Pointer to boot_params table + + xorl %ebx, %ebx + movw %cs, %bx + shll $4, %ebx + addl %ebx, 2f + jmp 1f # Short jump to serialize on 386/486 +1: + + movw $__BOOT_DS, %cx + movw $__BOOT_TSS, %di + + movl %cr0, %edx + orb $X86_CR0_PE, %dl # Protected mode + movl %edx, %cr0 + + # Transition to 32-bit mode + .byte 0x66, 0xea # ljmpl opcode +2: .long .Lin_pm32 # offset + .word __BOOT_CS # segment +SYM_FUNC_END(protected_mode_jump) + + .code32 + .section ".text32","ax" +SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lin_pm32) + # Set up data segments for flat 32-bit mode + movl %ecx, %ds + movl %ecx, %es + movl %ecx, %fs + movl %ecx, %gs + movl %ecx, %ss + # The 32-bit code sets up its own stack, but this way we do have + # a valid stack if some debugging hack wants to use it. + addl %ebx, %esp + + # Set up TR to make Intel VT happy + ltr %di + + # Clear registers to allow for future extensions to the + # 32-bit boot protocol + xorl %ecx, %ecx + xorl %edx, %edx + xorl %ebx, %ebx + xorl %ebp, %ebp + xorl %edi, %edi + + # Set up LDTR to make Intel VT happy + lldt %cx + + jmpl *%eax # Jump to the 32-bit entrypoint +SYM_FUNC_END(.Lin_pm32) |
