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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /arch/um/os-Linux/util.c
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/um/os-Linux/util.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/um/os-Linux/util.c209
1 files changed, 209 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/um/os-Linux/util.c b/arch/um/os-Linux/util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3ad71a0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000 - 2007 Jeff Dike (jdike@{addtoit,linux.intel}.com)
+ */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#include <init.h>
+#include <os.h>
+
+void stack_protections(unsigned long address)
+{
+ if (mprotect((void *) address, UM_THREAD_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE) < 0)
+ panic("protecting stack failed, errno = %d", errno);
+}
+
+int raw(int fd)
+{
+ struct termios tt;
+ int err;
+
+ CATCH_EINTR(err = tcgetattr(fd, &tt));
+ if (err < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ cfmakeraw(&tt);
+
+ CATCH_EINTR(err = tcsetattr(fd, TCSADRAIN, &tt));
+ if (err < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX tcsetattr could have applied only some changes
+ * (and cfmakeraw() is a set of changes)
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void setup_machinename(char *machine_out)
+{
+ struct utsname host;
+
+ uname(&host);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML_X86)
+# if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT)
+ if (!strcmp(host.machine, "x86_64")) {
+ strcpy(machine_out, "i686");
+ return;
+ }
+# else
+ if (!strcmp(host.machine, "i686")) {
+ strcpy(machine_out, "x86_64");
+ return;
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+ strcpy(machine_out, host.machine);
+}
+
+void setup_hostinfo(char *buf, int len)
+{
+ struct utsname host;
+
+ uname(&host);
+ snprintf(buf, len, "%s %s %s %s %s", host.sysname, host.nodename,
+ host.release, host.version, host.machine);
+}
+
+/*
+ * We cannot use glibc's abort(). It makes use of tgkill() which
+ * has no effect within UML's kernel threads.
+ * After that glibc would execute an invalid instruction to kill
+ * the calling process and UML crashes with SIGSEGV.
+ */
+static inline void __attribute__ ((noreturn)) uml_abort(void)
+{
+ sigset_t sig;
+
+ fflush(NULL);
+
+ if (!sigemptyset(&sig) && !sigaddset(&sig, SIGABRT))
+ sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &sig, 0);
+
+ for (;;)
+ if (kill(getpid(), SIGABRT) < 0)
+ exit(127);
+}
+
+ssize_t os_getrandom(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * UML helper threads must not handle SIGWINCH/INT/TERM
+ */
+void os_fix_helper_signals(void)
+{
+ signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+}
+
+void os_dump_core(void)
+{
+ int pid;
+
+ signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /*
+ * We are about to SIGTERM this entire process group to ensure that
+ * nothing is around to run after the kernel exits. The
+ * kernel wants to abort, not die through SIGTERM, so we
+ * ignore it here.
+ */
+
+ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
+ kill(0, SIGTERM);
+ /*
+ * Most of the other processes associated with this UML are
+ * likely sTopped, so give them a SIGCONT so they see the
+ * SIGTERM.
+ */
+ kill(0, SIGCONT);
+
+ /*
+ * Now, having sent signals to everyone but us, make sure they
+ * die by ptrace. Processes can survive what's been done to
+ * them so far - the mechanism I understand is receiving a
+ * SIGSEGV and segfaulting immediately upon return. There is
+ * always a SIGSEGV pending, and (I'm guessing) signals are
+ * processed in numeric order so the SIGTERM (signal 15 vs
+ * SIGSEGV being signal 11) is never handled.
+ *
+ * Run a waitpid loop until we get some kind of error.
+ * Hopefully, it's ECHILD, but there's not a lot we can do if
+ * it's something else. Tell os_kill_ptraced_process not to
+ * wait for the child to report its death because there's
+ * nothing reasonable to do if that fails.
+ */
+
+ while ((pid = waitpid(-1, NULL, WNOHANG | __WALL)) > 0)
+ os_kill_ptraced_process(pid, 0);
+
+ uml_abort();
+}
+
+void um_early_printk(const char *s, unsigned int n)
+{
+ printf("%.*s", n, s);
+}
+
+static int quiet_info;
+
+static int __init quiet_cmd_param(char *str, int *add)
+{
+ quiet_info = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__uml_setup("quiet", quiet_cmd_param,
+"quiet\n"
+" Turns off information messages during boot.\n\n");
+
+/*
+ * The os_info/os_warn functions will be called by helper threads. These
+ * have a very limited stack size and using the libc formatting functions
+ * may overflow the stack.
+ * So pull in the kernel vscnprintf and use that instead with a fixed
+ * on-stack buffer.
+ */
+int vscnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args);
+
+void os_info(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ va_list list;
+ int len;
+
+ if (quiet_info)
+ return;
+
+ va_start(list, fmt);
+ len = vscnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, list);
+ fwrite(buf, len, 1, stderr);
+ va_end(list);
+}
+
+void os_warn(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ va_list list;
+ int len;
+
+ va_start(list, fmt);
+ len = vscnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, list);
+ fwrite(buf, len, 1, stderr);
+ va_end(list);
+}