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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /arch/riscv/mm/extable.c
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
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x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/riscv/mm/extable.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/mm/extable.c102
1 files changed, 102 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/extable.c b/arch/riscv/mm/extable.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dd1530af3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/extable.c
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Sunplus Core Technology Co., Ltd.
+ * Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@sunplusct.com>
+ * Chen Liqin <liqin.chen@sunplusct.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Regents of the University of California
+ */
+
+
+#include <linux/bitfield.h>
+#include <linux/extable.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/asm-extable.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+
+static inline unsigned long
+get_ex_fixup(const struct exception_table_entry *ex)
+{
+ return ((unsigned long)&ex->fixup + ex->fixup);
+}
+
+static bool ex_handler_fixup(const struct exception_table_entry *ex,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ regs->epc = get_ex_fixup(ex);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long regs_get_gpr(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int offset)
+{
+ if (unlikely(!offset || offset > MAX_REG_OFFSET))
+ return 0;
+
+ return *(unsigned long *)((unsigned long)regs + offset);
+}
+
+static inline void regs_set_gpr(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int offset,
+ unsigned long val)
+{
+ if (unlikely(offset > MAX_REG_OFFSET))
+ return;
+
+ if (offset)
+ *(unsigned long *)((unsigned long)regs + offset) = val;
+}
+
+static bool ex_handler_uaccess_err_zero(const struct exception_table_entry *ex,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ int reg_err = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_REG_ERR, ex->data);
+ int reg_zero = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_REG_ZERO, ex->data);
+
+ regs_set_gpr(regs, reg_err * sizeof(unsigned long), -EFAULT);
+ regs_set_gpr(regs, reg_zero * sizeof(unsigned long), 0);
+
+ regs->epc = get_ex_fixup(ex);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool
+ex_handler_load_unaligned_zeropad(const struct exception_table_entry *ex,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ int reg_data = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_REG_DATA, ex->data);
+ int reg_addr = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_REG_ADDR, ex->data);
+ unsigned long data, addr, offset;
+
+ addr = regs_get_gpr(regs, reg_addr * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ offset = addr & 0x7UL;
+ addr &= ~0x7UL;
+
+ data = *(unsigned long *)addr >> (offset * 8);
+
+ regs_set_gpr(regs, reg_data * sizeof(unsigned long), data);
+
+ regs->epc = get_ex_fixup(ex);
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ const struct exception_table_entry *ex;
+
+ ex = search_exception_tables(regs->epc);
+ if (!ex)
+ return false;
+
+ switch (ex->type) {
+ case EX_TYPE_FIXUP:
+ return ex_handler_fixup(ex, regs);
+ case EX_TYPE_BPF:
+ return ex_handler_bpf(ex, regs);
+ case EX_TYPE_UACCESS_ERR_ZERO:
+ return ex_handler_uaccess_err_zero(ex, regs);
+ case EX_TYPE_LOAD_UNALIGNED_ZEROPAD:
+ return ex_handler_load_unaligned_zeropad(ex, regs);
+ }
+
+ BUG();
+}