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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh')
-rwxr-xr-xarch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh25
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh b/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..baed467a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+set -e
+
+# To debug, uncomment the following line
+# set -x
+
+# Output from -fpatchable-function-entry can only vary on ppc64 elfv2, so this
+# should not be invoked for other targets. Therefore we can pass in -m64 and
+# -mabi explicitly, to take care of toolchains defaulting to other targets.
+
+# Test whether the compile option -fpatchable-function-entry exists and
+# generates appropriate code
+echo "int func() { return 0; }" | \
+ $* -m64 -mabi=elfv2 -S -x c -O2 -fpatchable-function-entry=2 - -o - 2> /dev/null | \
+ grep -q "__patchable_function_entries"
+
+# Test whether nops are generated after the local entry point
+echo "int x; int func() { return x; }" | \
+ $* -m64 -mabi=elfv2 -S -x c -O2 -fpatchable-function-entry=2 - -o - 2> /dev/null | \
+ awk 'BEGIN { RS = ";" } /\.localentry.*nop.*\n[[:space:]]*nop/ { print $0 }' | \
+ grep -q "func:"
+
+exit 0