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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh')
| -rwxr-xr-x | arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh | 25 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh b/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..baed467a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +set -e + +# To debug, uncomment the following line +# set -x + +# Output from -fpatchable-function-entry can only vary on ppc64 elfv2, so this +# should not be invoked for other targets. Therefore we can pass in -m64 and +# -mabi explicitly, to take care of toolchains defaulting to other targets. + +# Test whether the compile option -fpatchable-function-entry exists and +# generates appropriate code +echo "int func() { return 0; }" | \ + $* -m64 -mabi=elfv2 -S -x c -O2 -fpatchable-function-entry=2 - -o - 2> /dev/null | \ + grep -q "__patchable_function_entries" + +# Test whether nops are generated after the local entry point +echo "int x; int func() { return x; }" | \ + $* -m64 -mabi=elfv2 -S -x c -O2 -fpatchable-function-entry=2 - -o - 2> /dev/null | \ + awk 'BEGIN { RS = ";" } /\.localentry.*nop.*\n[[:space:]]*nop/ { print $0 }' | \ + grep -q "func:" + +exit 0 |
