summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh')
-rwxr-xr-xarch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh25
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh b/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..baed467a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+set -e
+
+# To debug, uncomment the following line
+# set -x
+
+# Output from -fpatchable-function-entry can only vary on ppc64 elfv2, so this
+# should not be invoked for other targets. Therefore we can pass in -m64 and
+# -mabi explicitly, to take care of toolchains defaulting to other targets.
+
+# Test whether the compile option -fpatchable-function-entry exists and
+# generates appropriate code
+echo "int func() { return 0; }" | \
+ $* -m64 -mabi=elfv2 -S -x c -O2 -fpatchable-function-entry=2 - -o - 2> /dev/null | \
+ grep -q "__patchable_function_entries"
+
+# Test whether nops are generated after the local entry point
+echo "int x; int func() { return x; }" | \
+ $* -m64 -mabi=elfv2 -S -x c -O2 -fpatchable-function-entry=2 - -o - 2> /dev/null | \
+ awk 'BEGIN { RS = ";" } /\.localentry.*nop.*\n[[:space:]]*nop/ { print $0 }' | \
+ grep -q "func:"
+
+exit 0