ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted

When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().

If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.

Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.

For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.

Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock.

Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>

Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh b/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..baed467a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/tools/check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+set -e
+
+# To debug, uncomment the following line
+# set -x
+
+# Output from -fpatchable-function-entry can only vary on ppc64 elfv2, so this
+# should not be invoked for other targets. Therefore we can pass in -m64 and
+# -mabi explicitly, to take care of toolchains defaulting to other targets.
+
+# Test whether the compile option -fpatchable-function-entry exists and
+# generates appropriate code
+echo "int func() { return 0; }" | \
+    $* -m64 -mabi=elfv2 -S -x c -O2 -fpatchable-function-entry=2 - -o - 2> /dev/null | \
+    grep -q "__patchable_function_entries"
+
+# Test whether nops are generated after the local entry point
+echo "int x; int func() { return x; }" | \
+    $* -m64 -mabi=elfv2 -S -x c -O2 -fpatchable-function-entry=2 - -o - 2> /dev/null | \
+    awk 'BEGIN { RS = ";" } /\.localentry.*nop.*\n[[:space:]]*nop/ { print $0 }' | \
+    grep -q "func:"
+
+exit 0