diff options
| author | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400 |
| commit | 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch) | |
| tree | 350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c | |
| download | linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip | |
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since
it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls
ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that
if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to
have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other
call.
Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the
ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that
states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex
has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut
having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after
the mute is taken in case of races.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c | 115 |
1 files changed, 115 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..992cc5c98 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Performance counter callchain support - powerpc architecture code + * + * Copyright © 2009 Paul Mackerras, IBM Corporation. + */ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <linux/percpu.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <asm/ptrace.h> +#include <asm/sigcontext.h> +#include <asm/ucontext.h> +#include <asm/vdso.h> +#include <asm/pte-walk.h> + +#include "callchain.h" + +/* + * Is sp valid as the address of the next kernel stack frame after prev_sp? + * The next frame may be in a different stack area but should not go + * back down in the same stack area. + */ +static int valid_next_sp(unsigned long sp, unsigned long prev_sp) +{ + if (sp & 0xf) + return 0; /* must be 16-byte aligned */ + if (!validate_sp(sp, current)) + return 0; + if (sp >= prev_sp + STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE) + return 1; + /* + * sp could decrease when we jump off an interrupt stack + * back to the regular process stack. + */ + if ((sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) != (prev_sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1))) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +void __no_sanitize_address +perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + unsigned long sp, next_sp; + unsigned long next_ip; + unsigned long lr; + long level = 0; + unsigned long *fp; + + lr = regs->link; + sp = regs->gpr[1]; + perf_callchain_store(entry, perf_arch_instruction_pointer(regs)); + + if (!validate_sp(sp, current)) + return; + + for (;;) { + fp = (unsigned long *) sp; + next_sp = fp[0]; + + if (next_sp == sp + STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE && + validate_sp_size(sp, current, STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE) && + fp[STACK_INT_FRAME_MARKER_LONGS] == STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER) { + /* + * This looks like an interrupt frame for an + * interrupt that occurred in the kernel + */ + regs = (struct pt_regs *)(sp + STACK_INT_FRAME_REGS); + next_ip = regs->nip; + lr = regs->link; + level = 0; + perf_callchain_store_context(entry, PERF_CONTEXT_KERNEL); + + } else { + if (level == 0) + next_ip = lr; + else + next_ip = fp[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE]; + + /* + * We can't tell which of the first two addresses + * we get are valid, but we can filter out the + * obviously bogus ones here. We replace them + * with 0 rather than removing them entirely so + * that userspace can tell which is which. + */ + if ((level == 1 && next_ip == lr) || + (level <= 1 && !kernel_text_address(next_ip))) + next_ip = 0; + + ++level; + } + + perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip); + if (!valid_next_sp(next_sp, sp)) + return; + sp = next_sp; + } +} + +void +perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + perf_callchain_store(entry, perf_arch_instruction_pointer(regs)); + + if (!current->mm) + return; + + if (!is_32bit_task()) + perf_callchain_user_64(entry, regs); + else + perf_callchain_user_32(entry, regs); +} |
