perf/x86/intel: Rename DMR offcore_rsp attribute to offmodule_rspgrafted

DMR introduces Offmodule Response events in place of the legacy
Offcore Response events, but it still exposes the inherited
offcore_rsp PMU attribute for programming the corresponding MSR data.

Rename the DMR PMU attribute to offmodule_rsp so the sysfs interface
matches the underlying event name and avoids user & tooling confusion.

Signed-off-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260917015234.981153-12-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com

1 files changed, 115 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..992cc5c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Performance counter callchain support - powerpc architecture code
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2009 Paul Mackerras, IBM Corporation.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/sigcontext.h>
+#include <asm/ucontext.h>
+#include <asm/vdso.h>
+#include <asm/pte-walk.h>
+
+#include "callchain.h"
+
+/*
+ * Is sp valid as the address of the next kernel stack frame after prev_sp?
+ * The next frame may be in a different stack area but should not go
+ * back down in the same stack area.
+ */
+static int valid_next_sp(unsigned long sp, unsigned long prev_sp)
+{
+	if (sp & 0xf)
+		return 0;		/* must be 16-byte aligned */
+	if (!validate_sp(sp, current))
+		return 0;
+	if (sp >= prev_sp + STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE)
+		return 1;
+	/*
+	 * sp could decrease when we jump off an interrupt stack
+	 * back to the regular process stack.
+	 */
+	if ((sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) != (prev_sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __no_sanitize_address
+perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	unsigned long sp, next_sp;
+	unsigned long next_ip;
+	unsigned long lr;
+	long level = 0;
+	unsigned long *fp;
+
+	lr = regs->link;
+	sp = regs->gpr[1];
+	perf_callchain_store(entry, perf_arch_instruction_pointer(regs));
+
+	if (!validate_sp(sp, current))
+		return;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		fp = (unsigned long *) sp;
+		next_sp = fp[0];
+
+		if (next_sp == sp + STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE &&
+		    validate_sp_size(sp, current, STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE) &&
+		    fp[STACK_INT_FRAME_MARKER_LONGS] == STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER) {
+			/*
+			 * This looks like an interrupt frame for an
+			 * interrupt that occurred in the kernel
+			 */
+			regs = (struct pt_regs *)(sp + STACK_INT_FRAME_REGS);
+			next_ip = regs->nip;
+			lr = regs->link;
+			level = 0;
+			perf_callchain_store_context(entry, PERF_CONTEXT_KERNEL);
+
+		} else {
+			if (level == 0)
+				next_ip = lr;
+			else
+				next_ip = fp[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE];
+
+			/*
+			 * We can't tell which of the first two addresses
+			 * we get are valid, but we can filter out the
+			 * obviously bogus ones here.  We replace them
+			 * with 0 rather than removing them entirely so
+			 * that userspace can tell which is which.
+			 */
+			if ((level == 1 && next_ip == lr) ||
+			    (level <= 1 && !kernel_text_address(next_ip)))
+				next_ip = 0;
+
+			++level;
+		}
+
+		perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
+		if (!valid_next_sp(next_sp, sp))
+			return;
+		sp = next_sp;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	perf_callchain_store(entry, perf_arch_instruction_pointer(regs));
+
+	if (!current->mm)
+		return;
+
+	if (!is_32bit_task())
+		perf_callchain_user_64(entry, regs);
+	else
+		perf_callchain_user_32(entry, regs);
+}