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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/mips/tools/elf-entry.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/mips/tools/elf-entry.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/mips/tools/elf-entry.c | 103 |
1 files changed, 103 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/mips/tools/elf-entry.c b/arch/mips/tools/elf-entry.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dbd14ff05 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/mips/tools/elf-entry.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <byteswap.h> +#include <elf.h> +#include <endian.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#ifdef be32toh +/* If libc provides [bl]e{32,64}toh() then we'll use them */ +#elif BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN +# define be32toh(x) bswap_32(x) +# define le32toh(x) (x) +# define be64toh(x) bswap_64(x) +# define le64toh(x) (x) +#elif BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN +# define be32toh(x) (x) +# define le32toh(x) bswap_32(x) +# define be64toh(x) (x) +# define le64toh(x) bswap_64(x) +#endif + +__attribute__((noreturn)) +static void die(const char *msg) +{ + fputs(msg, stderr); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +} + +int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) +{ + uint64_t entry; + size_t nread; + FILE *file; + union { + Elf32_Ehdr ehdr32; + Elf64_Ehdr ehdr64; + } hdr; + + if (argc != 2) + die("Usage: elf-entry <elf-file>\n"); + + file = fopen(argv[1], "r"); + if (!file) { + perror("Unable to open input file"); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + nread = fread(&hdr, 1, sizeof(hdr), file); + if (nread != sizeof(hdr)) { + perror("Unable to read input file"); + fclose(file); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + if (memcmp(hdr.ehdr32.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG)) { + fclose(file); + die("Input is not an ELF\n"); + } + + switch (hdr.ehdr32.e_ident[EI_CLASS]) { + case ELFCLASS32: + switch (hdr.ehdr32.e_ident[EI_DATA]) { + case ELFDATA2LSB: + entry = le32toh(hdr.ehdr32.e_entry); + break; + case ELFDATA2MSB: + entry = be32toh(hdr.ehdr32.e_entry); + break; + default: + fclose(file); + die("Invalid ELF encoding\n"); + } + + /* Sign extend to form a canonical address */ + entry = (int64_t)(int32_t)entry; + break; + + case ELFCLASS64: + switch (hdr.ehdr32.e_ident[EI_DATA]) { + case ELFDATA2LSB: + entry = le64toh(hdr.ehdr64.e_entry); + break; + case ELFDATA2MSB: + entry = be64toh(hdr.ehdr64.e_entry); + break; + default: + fclose(file); + die("Invalid ELF encoding\n"); + } + break; + + default: + fclose(file); + die("Invalid ELF class\n"); + } + + printf("0x%016" PRIx64 "\n", entry); + fclose(file); + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} |
