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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/mips/mm/physaddr.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/mips/mm/physaddr.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/mm/physaddr.c50
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/mips/mm/physaddr.c b/arch/mips/mm/physaddr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a6b1bf820
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/mips/mm/physaddr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mmdebug.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <asm/addrspace.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/dma.h>
+
+static inline bool __debug_virt_addr_valid(unsigned long x)
+{
+ /*
+ * MAX_DMA_ADDRESS is a virtual address that may not correspond to an
+ * actual physical address. Enough code relies on
+ * virt_to_phys(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS) that we just need to work around it
+ * and always return true.
+ */
+ if (x == MAX_DMA_ADDRESS)
+ return true;
+
+ return x >= PAGE_OFFSET && (KSEGX(x) < KSEG2 ||
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVA) ||
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HIGHMEM));
+}
+
+phys_addr_t __virt_to_phys(volatile const void *x)
+{
+ WARN(!__debug_virt_addr_valid((unsigned long)x),
+ "virt_to_phys used for non-linear address: %p (%pS)\n",
+ x, x);
+
+ return __virt_to_phys_nodebug(x);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__virt_to_phys);
+
+phys_addr_t __phys_addr_symbol(unsigned long x)
+{
+ /* This is bounds checking against the kernel image only.
+ * __pa_symbol should only be used on kernel symbol addresses.
+ */
+ VIRTUAL_BUG_ON(x < (unsigned long)_text ||
+ x > (unsigned long)_end);
+
+ return __pa_symbol_nodebug(x);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__phys_addr_symbol);