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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/mips/lib/uncached.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/mips/lib/uncached.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/mips/lib/uncached.c | 82 |
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/mips/lib/uncached.c b/arch/mips/lib/uncached.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f80a67c09 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/mips/lib/uncached.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public + * License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of this archive + * for more details. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005 Thiemo Seufer + * Copyright (C) 2005 MIPS Technologies, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Author: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com> + */ + + +#include <asm/addrspace.h> +#include <asm/bug.h> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h> + +#ifndef CKSEG2 +#define CKSEG2 CKSSEG +#endif +#ifndef TO_PHYS_MASK +#define TO_PHYS_MASK -1 +#endif + +/* + * FUNC is executed in one of the uncached segments, depending on its + * original address as follows: + * + * 1. If the original address is in CKSEG0 or CKSEG1, then the uncached + * segment used is CKSEG1. + * 2. If the original address is in XKPHYS, then the uncached segment + * used is XKPHYS(2). + * 3. Otherwise it's a bug. + * + * The same remapping is done with the stack pointer. Stack handling + * works because we don't handle stack arguments or more complex return + * values, so we can avoid sharing the same stack area between a cached + * and the uncached mode. + */ +unsigned long run_uncached(void *func) +{ + register long ret __asm__("$2"); + long lfunc = (long)func, ufunc; + long usp; + long sp; + + __asm__("move %0, $sp" : "=r" (sp)); + + if (sp >= (long)CKSEG0 && sp < (long)CKSEG2) + usp = CKSEG1ADDR(sp); +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + else if ((long long)sp >= (long long)PHYS_TO_XKPHYS(0, 0) && + (long long)sp < (long long)PHYS_TO_XKPHYS(8, 0)) + usp = PHYS_TO_XKPHYS(K_CALG_UNCACHED, + XKPHYS_TO_PHYS((long long)sp)); +#endif + else { + BUG(); + usp = sp; + } + if (lfunc >= (long)CKSEG0 && lfunc < (long)CKSEG2) + ufunc = CKSEG1ADDR(lfunc); +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + else if ((long long)lfunc >= (long long)PHYS_TO_XKPHYS(0, 0) && + (long long)lfunc < (long long)PHYS_TO_XKPHYS(8, 0)) + ufunc = PHYS_TO_XKPHYS(K_CALG_UNCACHED, + XKPHYS_TO_PHYS((long long)lfunc)); +#endif + else { + BUG(); + ufunc = lfunc; + } + + __asm__ __volatile__ ( + " move $16, $sp\n" + " move $sp, %1\n" + " jalr %2\n" + " move $sp, $16" + : "=r" (ret) + : "r" (usp), "r" (ufunc) + : "$16", "$31"); + + return ret; +} |
