usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted

generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of
ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:

    u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F);  /* 0 .. 15 */
    ...
    con->data[cmd] = value;            /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */

struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as
a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44
bytes past the end of the array on the heap.

A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR
request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds
access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.

Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions.

Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>
Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 32 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/mips/generic/vmlinux.its.S b/arch/mips/generic/vmlinux.its.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e2546765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/mips/generic/vmlinux.its.S
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/dts-v1/;
+
+/ {
+	description = KERNEL_NAME;
+	#address-cells = <ADDR_CELLS>;
+
+	images {
+		kernel {
+			description = KERNEL_NAME;
+			data = /incbin/(VMLINUX_BINARY);
+			type = "kernel";
+			arch = "mips";
+			os = "linux";
+			compression = VMLINUX_COMPRESSION;
+			load = /bits/ ADDR_BITS <VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS>;
+			entry = /bits/ ADDR_BITS <VMLINUX_ENTRY_ADDRESS>;
+			hash {
+				algo = "sha1";
+			};
+		};
+	};
+
+	configurations {
+		default = "conf-default";
+
+		conf-default {
+			description = "Generic Linux kernel";
+			kernel = "kernel";
+		};
+	};
+};