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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-usb-usbd.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-usb-usbd.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-usb-usbd.c | 65 |
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-usb-usbd.c b/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-usb-usbd.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..508bd9d8d --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-usb-usbd.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public + * License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of this archive + * for more details. + * + * Copyright (C) 2008 Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr> + * Copyright (C) 2012 Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@gmail.com> + * Copyright (C) 2012 Broadcom Corporation + */ + +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <bcm63xx_cpu.h> +#include <bcm63xx_dev_usb_usbd.h> + +#define NUM_MMIO 2 +#define NUM_IRQ 7 + +static struct resource usbd_resources[NUM_MMIO + NUM_IRQ]; + +static u64 usbd_dmamask = DMA_BIT_MASK(32); + +static struct platform_device bcm63xx_usbd_device = { + .name = "bcm63xx_udc", + .id = -1, + .num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(usbd_resources), + .resource = usbd_resources, + .dev = { + .dma_mask = &usbd_dmamask, + .coherent_dma_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(32), + }, +}; + +int __init bcm63xx_usbd_register(const struct bcm63xx_usbd_platform_data *pd) +{ + const int irq_list[NUM_IRQ] = { IRQ_USBD, + IRQ_USBD_RXDMA0, IRQ_USBD_TXDMA0, + IRQ_USBD_RXDMA1, IRQ_USBD_TXDMA1, + IRQ_USBD_RXDMA2, IRQ_USBD_TXDMA2 }; + int i; + + if (!BCMCPU_IS_6328() && !BCMCPU_IS_6368()) + return 0; + + usbd_resources[0].start = bcm63xx_regset_address(RSET_USBD); + usbd_resources[0].end = usbd_resources[0].start + RSET_USBD_SIZE - 1; + usbd_resources[0].flags = IORESOURCE_MEM; + + usbd_resources[1].start = bcm63xx_regset_address(RSET_USBDMA); + usbd_resources[1].end = usbd_resources[1].start + RSET_USBDMA_SIZE - 1; + usbd_resources[1].flags = IORESOURCE_MEM; + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_IRQ; i++) { + struct resource *r = &usbd_resources[NUM_MMIO + i]; + + r->start = r->end = bcm63xx_get_irq_number(irq_list[i]); + r->flags = IORESOURCE_IRQ; + } + + platform_device_add_data(&bcm63xx_usbd_device, pd, sizeof(*pd)); + + return platform_device_register(&bcm63xx_usbd_device); +} |
