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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-uart.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-uart.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-uart.c | 77 |
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-uart.c b/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-uart.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5d6bf0445 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-uart.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public + * License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of this archive + * for more details. + * + * Copyright (C) 2008 Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr> + */ + +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <bcm63xx_cpu.h> +#include <bcm63xx_dev_uart.h> + +static struct resource uart0_resources[] = { + { + /* start & end filled at runtime */ + .flags = IORESOURCE_MEM, + }, + { + /* start filled at runtime */ + .flags = IORESOURCE_IRQ, + }, +}; + +static struct resource uart1_resources[] = { + { + /* start & end filled at runtime */ + .flags = IORESOURCE_MEM, + }, + { + /* start filled at runtime */ + .flags = IORESOURCE_IRQ, + }, +}; + +static struct platform_device bcm63xx_uart_devices[] = { + { + .name = "bcm63xx_uart", + .id = 0, + .num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(uart0_resources), + .resource = uart0_resources, + }, + + { + .name = "bcm63xx_uart", + .id = 1, + .num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(uart1_resources), + .resource = uart1_resources, + } +}; + +int __init bcm63xx_uart_register(unsigned int id) +{ + if (id >= ARRAY_SIZE(bcm63xx_uart_devices)) + return -ENODEV; + + if (id == 1 && (!BCMCPU_IS_3368() && !BCMCPU_IS_6358() && + !BCMCPU_IS_6368())) + return -ENODEV; + + if (id == 0) { + uart0_resources[0].start = bcm63xx_regset_address(RSET_UART0); + uart0_resources[0].end = uart0_resources[0].start + + RSET_UART_SIZE - 1; + uart0_resources[1].start = bcm63xx_get_irq_number(IRQ_UART0); + } + + if (id == 1) { + uart1_resources[0].start = bcm63xx_regset_address(RSET_UART1); + uart1_resources[0].end = uart1_resources[0].start + + RSET_UART_SIZE - 1; + uart1_resources[1].start = bcm63xx_get_irq_number(IRQ_UART1); + } + + return platform_device_register(&bcm63xx_uart_devices[id]); +} |
