openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 60 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-spi.c b/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-spi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..232385441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/mips/bcm63xx/dev-spi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public
+ * License.  See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of this archive
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2011 Florian Fainelli <florian@openwrt.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Tanguy Bouzeloc <tanguy.bouzeloc@efixo.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/clk.h>
+
+#include <bcm63xx_cpu.h>
+#include <bcm63xx_dev_spi.h>
+#include <bcm63xx_regs.h>
+
+static struct resource spi_resources[] = {
+	{
+		.start		= -1, /* filled at runtime */
+		.end		= -1, /* filled at runtime */
+		.flags		= IORESOURCE_MEM,
+	},
+	{
+		.start		= -1, /* filled at runtime */
+		.flags		= IORESOURCE_IRQ,
+	},
+};
+
+static struct platform_device bcm63xx_spi_device = {
+	.id		= -1,
+	.num_resources	= ARRAY_SIZE(spi_resources),
+	.resource	= spi_resources,
+};
+
+int __init bcm63xx_spi_register(void)
+{
+	if (BCMCPU_IS_6328() || BCMCPU_IS_6345())
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	spi_resources[0].start = bcm63xx_regset_address(RSET_SPI);
+	spi_resources[0].end = spi_resources[0].start;
+	spi_resources[1].start = bcm63xx_get_irq_number(IRQ_SPI);
+
+	if (BCMCPU_IS_6338() || BCMCPU_IS_6348()) {
+		bcm63xx_spi_device.name = "bcm6348-spi",
+		spi_resources[0].end += BCM_6348_RSET_SPI_SIZE - 1;
+	}
+
+	if (BCMCPU_IS_3368() || BCMCPU_IS_6358() || BCMCPU_IS_6362() ||
+		BCMCPU_IS_6368()) {
+		bcm63xx_spi_device.name = "bcm6358-spi",
+		spi_resources[0].end += BCM_6358_RSET_SPI_SIZE - 1;
+	}
+
+	return platform_device_register(&bcm63xx_spi_device);
+}