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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/microblaze/lib/modsi3.S | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/microblaze/lib/modsi3.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/microblaze/lib/modsi3.S | 74 |
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/lib/modsi3.S b/arch/microblaze/lib/modsi3.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..64154865c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/microblaze/lib/modsi3.S @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +/* +* modulo operation for 32 bit integers. +* Input : op1 in Reg r5 +* op2 in Reg r6 +* Output: op1 mod op2 in Reg r3 +*/ + + .text + .globl __modsi3 + .type __modsi3, @function + .ent __modsi3 + +__modsi3: + .frame r1, 0, r15 + + addik r1, r1, -16 + swi r28, r1, 0 + swi r29, r1, 4 + swi r30, r1, 8 + swi r31, r1, 12 + + beqi r6, div_by_zero /* div_by_zero division error */ + beqi r5, result_is_zero /* result is zero */ + bgeid r5, r5_pos + /* get the sign of the result [ depends only on the first arg] */ + add r28, r5, r0 + rsubi r5, r5, 0 /* make r5 positive */ +r5_pos: + bgei r6, r6_pos + rsubi r6, r6, 0 /* make r6 positive */ +r6_pos: + addik r3, r0, 0 /* clear mod */ + addik r30, r0, 0 /* clear div */ + addik r29, r0, 32 /* initialize the loop count */ +/* first part try to find the first '1' in the r5 */ +div1: + add r5, r5, r5 /* left shift logical r5 */ + bgeid r5, div1 + addik r29, r29, -1 +div2: + /* left shift logical r5 get the '1' into the carry */ + add r5, r5, r5 + addc r3, r3, r3 /* move that bit into the mod register */ + rsub r31, r6, r3 /* try to subtract (r30 a r6) */ + blti r31, mod_too_small + /* move the r31 to mod since the result was positive */ + or r3, r0, r31 + addik r30, r30, 1 +mod_too_small: + addik r29, r29, -1 + beqi r29, loop_end + add r30, r30, r30 /* shift in the '1' into div */ + bri div2 /* div2 */ +loop_end: + bgei r28, return_here + brid return_here + rsubi r3, r3, 0 /* negate the result */ +div_by_zero: +result_is_zero: + or r3, r0, r0 /* set result to 0 [both mod as well as div are 0] */ +return_here: +/* restore values of csrs and that of r3 and the divisor and the dividend */ + lwi r28, r1, 0 + lwi r29, r1, 4 + lwi r30, r1, 8 + lwi r31, r1, 12 + rtsd r15, 8 + addik r1, r1, 16 + +.size __modsi3, . - __modsi3 +.end __modsi3 |
