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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /arch/arm64/lib/csum.c
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/lib/csum.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/lib/csum.c157
1 files changed, 157 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/csum.c b/arch/arm64/lib/csum.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2432683e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/csum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Arm Ltd.
+
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+
+#include <net/checksum.h>
+
+/* Looks dumb, but generates nice-ish code */
+static u64 accumulate(u64 sum, u64 data)
+{
+ __uint128_t tmp = (__uint128_t)sum + data;
+ return tmp + (tmp >> 64);
+}
+
+/*
+ * We over-read the buffer and this makes KASAN unhappy. Instead, disable
+ * instrumentation and call kasan explicitly.
+ */
+unsigned int __no_sanitize_address do_csum(const unsigned char *buff, int len)
+{
+ unsigned int offset, shift, sum;
+ const u64 *ptr;
+ u64 data, sum64 = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(len <= 0))
+ return 0;
+
+ offset = (unsigned long)buff & 7;
+ /*
+ * This is to all intents and purposes safe, since rounding down cannot
+ * result in a different page or cache line being accessed, and @buff
+ * should absolutely not be pointing to anything read-sensitive. We do,
+ * however, have to be careful not to piss off KASAN, which means using
+ * unchecked reads to accommodate the head and tail, for which we'll
+ * compensate with an explicit check up-front.
+ */
+ kasan_check_read(buff, len);
+ ptr = (u64 *)(buff - offset);
+ len = len + offset - 8;
+
+ /*
+ * Head: zero out any excess leading bytes. Shifting back by the same
+ * amount should be at least as fast as any other way of handling the
+ * odd/even alignment, and means we can ignore it until the very end.
+ */
+ shift = offset * 8;
+ data = *ptr++;
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ data = (data >> shift) << shift;
+#else
+ data = (data << shift) >> shift;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Body: straightforward aligned loads from here on (the paired loads
+ * underlying the quadword type still only need dword alignment). The
+ * main loop strictly excludes the tail, so the second loop will always
+ * run at least once.
+ */
+ while (unlikely(len > 64)) {
+ __uint128_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4;
+
+ tmp1 = *(__uint128_t *)ptr;
+ tmp2 = *(__uint128_t *)(ptr + 2);
+ tmp3 = *(__uint128_t *)(ptr + 4);
+ tmp4 = *(__uint128_t *)(ptr + 6);
+
+ len -= 64;
+ ptr += 8;
+
+ /* This is the "don't dump the carry flag into a GPR" idiom */
+ tmp1 += (tmp1 >> 64) | (tmp1 << 64);
+ tmp2 += (tmp2 >> 64) | (tmp2 << 64);
+ tmp3 += (tmp3 >> 64) | (tmp3 << 64);
+ tmp4 += (tmp4 >> 64) | (tmp4 << 64);
+ tmp1 = ((tmp1 >> 64) << 64) | (tmp2 >> 64);
+ tmp1 += (tmp1 >> 64) | (tmp1 << 64);
+ tmp3 = ((tmp3 >> 64) << 64) | (tmp4 >> 64);
+ tmp3 += (tmp3 >> 64) | (tmp3 << 64);
+ tmp1 = ((tmp1 >> 64) << 64) | (tmp3 >> 64);
+ tmp1 += (tmp1 >> 64) | (tmp1 << 64);
+ tmp1 = ((tmp1 >> 64) << 64) | sum64;
+ tmp1 += (tmp1 >> 64) | (tmp1 << 64);
+ sum64 = tmp1 >> 64;
+ }
+ while (len > 8) {
+ __uint128_t tmp;
+
+ sum64 = accumulate(sum64, data);
+ tmp = *(__uint128_t *)ptr;
+
+ len -= 16;
+ ptr += 2;
+
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ data = tmp >> 64;
+ sum64 = accumulate(sum64, tmp);
+#else
+ data = tmp;
+ sum64 = accumulate(sum64, tmp >> 64);
+#endif
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ sum64 = accumulate(sum64, data);
+ data = *ptr;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Tail: zero any over-read bytes similarly to the head, again
+ * preserving odd/even alignment.
+ */
+ shift = len * -8;
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ data = (data << shift) >> shift;
+#else
+ data = (data >> shift) << shift;
+#endif
+ sum64 = accumulate(sum64, data);
+
+ /* Finally, folding */
+ sum64 += (sum64 >> 32) | (sum64 << 32);
+ sum = sum64 >> 32;
+ sum += (sum >> 16) | (sum << 16);
+ if (offset & 1)
+ return (u16)swab32(sum);
+
+ return sum >> 16;
+}
+
+__sum16 csum_ipv6_magic(const struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr,
+ __u32 len, __u8 proto, __wsum csum)
+{
+ __uint128_t src, dst;
+ u64 sum = (__force u64)csum;
+
+ src = *(const __uint128_t *)saddr->s6_addr;
+ dst = *(const __uint128_t *)daddr->s6_addr;
+
+ sum += (__force u32)htonl(len);
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ sum += (u32)proto << 24;
+#else
+ sum += proto;
+#endif
+ src += (src >> 64) | (src << 64);
+ dst += (dst >> 64) | (dst << 64);
+
+ sum = accumulate(sum, src >> 64);
+ sum = accumulate(sum, dst >> 64);
+
+ sum += ((sum >> 32) | (sum << 32));
+ return csum_fold((__force __wsum)(sum >> 32));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_ipv6_magic);