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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /arch/arm64/lib/csum.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/lib/csum.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/lib/csum.c | 157 |
1 files changed, 157 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/csum.c b/arch/arm64/lib/csum.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2432683e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/csum.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +// Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Arm Ltd. + +#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/kasan-checks.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> + +#include <net/checksum.h> + +/* Looks dumb, but generates nice-ish code */ +static u64 accumulate(u64 sum, u64 data) +{ + __uint128_t tmp = (__uint128_t)sum + data; + return tmp + (tmp >> 64); +} + +/* + * We over-read the buffer and this makes KASAN unhappy. Instead, disable + * instrumentation and call kasan explicitly. + */ +unsigned int __no_sanitize_address do_csum(const unsigned char *buff, int len) +{ + unsigned int offset, shift, sum; + const u64 *ptr; + u64 data, sum64 = 0; + + if (unlikely(len <= 0)) + return 0; + + offset = (unsigned long)buff & 7; + /* + * This is to all intents and purposes safe, since rounding down cannot + * result in a different page or cache line being accessed, and @buff + * should absolutely not be pointing to anything read-sensitive. We do, + * however, have to be careful not to piss off KASAN, which means using + * unchecked reads to accommodate the head and tail, for which we'll + * compensate with an explicit check up-front. + */ + kasan_check_read(buff, len); + ptr = (u64 *)(buff - offset); + len = len + offset - 8; + + /* + * Head: zero out any excess leading bytes. Shifting back by the same + * amount should be at least as fast as any other way of handling the + * odd/even alignment, and means we can ignore it until the very end. + */ + shift = offset * 8; + data = *ptr++; +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN + data = (data >> shift) << shift; +#else + data = (data << shift) >> shift; +#endif + + /* + * Body: straightforward aligned loads from here on (the paired loads + * underlying the quadword type still only need dword alignment). The + * main loop strictly excludes the tail, so the second loop will always + * run at least once. + */ + while (unlikely(len > 64)) { + __uint128_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4; + + tmp1 = *(__uint128_t *)ptr; + tmp2 = *(__uint128_t *)(ptr + 2); + tmp3 = *(__uint128_t *)(ptr + 4); + tmp4 = *(__uint128_t *)(ptr + 6); + + len -= 64; + ptr += 8; + + /* This is the "don't dump the carry flag into a GPR" idiom */ + tmp1 += (tmp1 >> 64) | (tmp1 << 64); + tmp2 += (tmp2 >> 64) | (tmp2 << 64); + tmp3 += (tmp3 >> 64) | (tmp3 << 64); + tmp4 += (tmp4 >> 64) | (tmp4 << 64); + tmp1 = ((tmp1 >> 64) << 64) | (tmp2 >> 64); + tmp1 += (tmp1 >> 64) | (tmp1 << 64); + tmp3 = ((tmp3 >> 64) << 64) | (tmp4 >> 64); + tmp3 += (tmp3 >> 64) | (tmp3 << 64); + tmp1 = ((tmp1 >> 64) << 64) | (tmp3 >> 64); + tmp1 += (tmp1 >> 64) | (tmp1 << 64); + tmp1 = ((tmp1 >> 64) << 64) | sum64; + tmp1 += (tmp1 >> 64) | (tmp1 << 64); + sum64 = tmp1 >> 64; + } + while (len > 8) { + __uint128_t tmp; + + sum64 = accumulate(sum64, data); + tmp = *(__uint128_t *)ptr; + + len -= 16; + ptr += 2; + +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN + data = tmp >> 64; + sum64 = accumulate(sum64, tmp); +#else + data = tmp; + sum64 = accumulate(sum64, tmp >> 64); +#endif + } + if (len > 0) { + sum64 = accumulate(sum64, data); + data = *ptr; + len -= 8; + } + /* + * Tail: zero any over-read bytes similarly to the head, again + * preserving odd/even alignment. + */ + shift = len * -8; +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN + data = (data << shift) >> shift; +#else + data = (data >> shift) << shift; +#endif + sum64 = accumulate(sum64, data); + + /* Finally, folding */ + sum64 += (sum64 >> 32) | (sum64 << 32); + sum = sum64 >> 32; + sum += (sum >> 16) | (sum << 16); + if (offset & 1) + return (u16)swab32(sum); + + return sum >> 16; +} + +__sum16 csum_ipv6_magic(const struct in6_addr *saddr, + const struct in6_addr *daddr, + __u32 len, __u8 proto, __wsum csum) +{ + __uint128_t src, dst; + u64 sum = (__force u64)csum; + + src = *(const __uint128_t *)saddr->s6_addr; + dst = *(const __uint128_t *)daddr->s6_addr; + + sum += (__force u32)htonl(len); +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN + sum += (u32)proto << 24; +#else + sum += proto; +#endif + src += (src >> 64) | (src << 64); + dst += (dst >> 64) | (dst << 64); + + sum = accumulate(sum, src >> 64); + sum = accumulate(sum, dst >> 64); + + sum += ((sum >> 32) | (sum << 32)); + return csum_fold((__force __wsum)(sum >> 32)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_ipv6_magic); |
