openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/extable.c b/arch/arm/mm/extable.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc3356459
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/extable.c
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ *  linux/arch/arm/mm/extable.c
+ */
+#include <linux/extable.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	const struct exception_table_entry *fixup;
+
+	fixup = search_exception_tables(instruction_pointer(regs));
+	if (fixup) {
+		regs->ARM_pc = fixup->fixup;
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+		/* Clear the IT state to avoid nasty surprises in the fixup */
+		regs->ARM_cpsr &= ~PSR_IT_MASK;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	return fixup != NULL;
+}