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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/arm/lib/putuser.S | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/lib/putuser.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/lib/putuser.S | 95 |
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S b/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bdd8836dc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * linux/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S + * + * Copyright (C) 2001 Russell King + * + * Idea from x86 version, (C) Copyright 1998 Linus Torvalds + * + * These functions have a non-standard call interface to make + * them more efficient, especially as they return an error + * value in addition to the "real" return value. + * + * __put_user_X + * + * Inputs: r0 contains the address + * r1 contains the address limit, which must be preserved + * r2, r3 contains the value + * Outputs: r0 is the error code + * lr corrupted + * + * No other registers must be altered. (see <asm/uaccess.h> + * for specific ASM register usage). + * + * Note that ADDR_LIMIT is either 0 or 0xc0000000 + * Note also that it is intended that __put_user_bad is not global. + */ +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/errno.h> +#include <asm/domain.h> + +ENTRY(__put_user_1) + check_uaccess r0, 1, r1, ip, __put_user_bad +1: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0] + mov r0, #0 + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_1) + +ENTRY(__put_user_2) + check_uaccess r0, 2, r1, ip, __put_user_bad +#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6 + +2: TUSER(strh) r2, [r0] + +#else + + mov ip, r2, lsr #8 +#ifndef __ARMEB__ +2: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0], #1 +3: TUSER(strb) ip, [r0] +#else +2: TUSER(strb) ip, [r0], #1 +3: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0] +#endif + +#endif /* __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6 */ + mov r0, #0 + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_2) + +ENTRY(__put_user_4) + check_uaccess r0, 4, r1, ip, __put_user_bad +4: TUSER(str) r2, [r0] + mov r0, #0 + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_4) + +ENTRY(__put_user_8) + check_uaccess r0, 8, r1, ip, __put_user_bad +#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL +5: TUSER(str) r2, [r0] +6: TUSER(str) r3, [r0, #4] +#else +5: TUSER(str) r2, [r0], #4 +6: TUSER(str) r3, [r0] +#endif + mov r0, #0 + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_8) + +__put_user_bad: + mov r0, #-EFAULT + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_bad) + +.pushsection __ex_table, "a" + .long 1b, __put_user_bad + .long 2b, __put_user_bad +#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6 + .long 3b, __put_user_bad +#endif + .long 4b, __put_user_bad + .long 5b, __put_user_bad + .long 6b, __put_user_bad +.popsection |
