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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /arch/arm/lib/putuser.S | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/lib/putuser.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/lib/putuser.S | 95 |
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S b/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bdd8836dc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * linux/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S + * + * Copyright (C) 2001 Russell King + * + * Idea from x86 version, (C) Copyright 1998 Linus Torvalds + * + * These functions have a non-standard call interface to make + * them more efficient, especially as they return an error + * value in addition to the "real" return value. + * + * __put_user_X + * + * Inputs: r0 contains the address + * r1 contains the address limit, which must be preserved + * r2, r3 contains the value + * Outputs: r0 is the error code + * lr corrupted + * + * No other registers must be altered. (see <asm/uaccess.h> + * for specific ASM register usage). + * + * Note that ADDR_LIMIT is either 0 or 0xc0000000 + * Note also that it is intended that __put_user_bad is not global. + */ +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/errno.h> +#include <asm/domain.h> + +ENTRY(__put_user_1) + check_uaccess r0, 1, r1, ip, __put_user_bad +1: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0] + mov r0, #0 + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_1) + +ENTRY(__put_user_2) + check_uaccess r0, 2, r1, ip, __put_user_bad +#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6 + +2: TUSER(strh) r2, [r0] + +#else + + mov ip, r2, lsr #8 +#ifndef __ARMEB__ +2: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0], #1 +3: TUSER(strb) ip, [r0] +#else +2: TUSER(strb) ip, [r0], #1 +3: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0] +#endif + +#endif /* __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6 */ + mov r0, #0 + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_2) + +ENTRY(__put_user_4) + check_uaccess r0, 4, r1, ip, __put_user_bad +4: TUSER(str) r2, [r0] + mov r0, #0 + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_4) + +ENTRY(__put_user_8) + check_uaccess r0, 8, r1, ip, __put_user_bad +#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL +5: TUSER(str) r2, [r0] +6: TUSER(str) r3, [r0, #4] +#else +5: TUSER(str) r2, [r0], #4 +6: TUSER(str) r3, [r0] +#endif + mov r0, #0 + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_8) + +__put_user_bad: + mov r0, #-EFAULT + ret lr +ENDPROC(__put_user_bad) + +.pushsection __ex_table, "a" + .long 1b, __put_user_bad + .long 2b, __put_user_bad +#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6 + .long 3b, __put_user_bad +#endif + .long 4b, __put_user_bad + .long 5b, __put_user_bad + .long 6b, __put_user_bad +.popsection |
