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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /arch/arm/lib/putuser.S
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/lib/putuser.S')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/lib/putuser.S95
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S b/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bdd8836dc
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+++ b/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S
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+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * linux/arch/arm/lib/putuser.S
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Russell King
+ *
+ * Idea from x86 version, (C) Copyright 1998 Linus Torvalds
+ *
+ * These functions have a non-standard call interface to make
+ * them more efficient, especially as they return an error
+ * value in addition to the "real" return value.
+ *
+ * __put_user_X
+ *
+ * Inputs: r0 contains the address
+ * r1 contains the address limit, which must be preserved
+ * r2, r3 contains the value
+ * Outputs: r0 is the error code
+ * lr corrupted
+ *
+ * No other registers must be altered. (see <asm/uaccess.h>
+ * for specific ASM register usage).
+ *
+ * Note that ADDR_LIMIT is either 0 or 0xc0000000
+ * Note also that it is intended that __put_user_bad is not global.
+ */
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/assembler.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
+#include <asm/domain.h>
+
+ENTRY(__put_user_1)
+ check_uaccess r0, 1, r1, ip, __put_user_bad
+1: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0]
+ mov r0, #0
+ ret lr
+ENDPROC(__put_user_1)
+
+ENTRY(__put_user_2)
+ check_uaccess r0, 2, r1, ip, __put_user_bad
+#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6
+
+2: TUSER(strh) r2, [r0]
+
+#else
+
+ mov ip, r2, lsr #8
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+2: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0], #1
+3: TUSER(strb) ip, [r0]
+#else
+2: TUSER(strb) ip, [r0], #1
+3: TUSER(strb) r2, [r0]
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6 */
+ mov r0, #0
+ ret lr
+ENDPROC(__put_user_2)
+
+ENTRY(__put_user_4)
+ check_uaccess r0, 4, r1, ip, __put_user_bad
+4: TUSER(str) r2, [r0]
+ mov r0, #0
+ ret lr
+ENDPROC(__put_user_4)
+
+ENTRY(__put_user_8)
+ check_uaccess r0, 8, r1, ip, __put_user_bad
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+5: TUSER(str) r2, [r0]
+6: TUSER(str) r3, [r0, #4]
+#else
+5: TUSER(str) r2, [r0], #4
+6: TUSER(str) r3, [r0]
+#endif
+ mov r0, #0
+ ret lr
+ENDPROC(__put_user_8)
+
+__put_user_bad:
+ mov r0, #-EFAULT
+ ret lr
+ENDPROC(__put_user_bad)
+
+.pushsection __ex_table, "a"
+ .long 1b, __put_user_bad
+ .long 2b, __put_user_bad
+#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6
+ .long 3b, __put_user_bad
+#endif
+ .long 4b, __put_user_bad
+ .long 5b, __put_user_bad
+ .long 6b, __put_user_bad
+.popsection