staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm/common/Makefile b/arch/arm/common/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..973338107
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/common/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for the linux kernel.
+#
+
+obj-y				+= firmware.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SA1111)		+= sa1111.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KRAIT_L2_ACCESSORS) += krait-l2-accessors.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SHARP_LOCOMO)	+= locomo.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SHARP_PARAM)	+= sharpsl_param.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SHARP_SCOOP)	+= scoop.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= secure_cntvoff.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MCPM)		+= mcpm_head.o mcpm_entry.o mcpm_platsmp.o vlock.o
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_mcpm_entry.o	= -pg
+obj-$(CONFIG_BL_SWITCHER)	+= bL_switcher.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_BL_SWITCHER_DUMMY_IF) += bL_switcher_dummy_if.o