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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/arc/lib/strcmp-archs.S | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arc/lib/strcmp-archs.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arc/lib/strcmp-archs.S | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arc/lib/strcmp-archs.S b/arch/arc/lib/strcmp-archs.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7cffb3717 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arc/lib/strcmp-archs.S @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2014-15 Synopsys, Inc. (www.synopsys.com) + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +ENTRY_CFI(strcmp) + or r2, r0, r1 + bmsk_s r2, r2, 1 + brne r2, 0, @.Lcharloop + +;;; s1 and s2 are word aligned + ld.ab r2, [r0, 4] + + mov_s r12, 0x01010101 + ror r11, r12 + .align 4 +.LwordLoop: + ld.ab r3, [r1, 4] + ;; Detect NULL char in str1 + sub r4, r2, r12 + ld.ab r5, [r0, 4] + bic r4, r4, r2 + and r4, r4, r11 + brne.d.nt r4, 0, .LfoundNULL + ;; Check if the read locations are the same + cmp r2, r3 + beq.d .LwordLoop + mov.eq r2, r5 + + ;; A match is found, spot it out +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ + swape r3, r3 + mov_s r0, 1 + swape r2, r2 +#else + mov_s r0, 1 +#endif + cmp_s r2, r3 + j_s.d [blink] + bset.lo r0, r0, 31 + + .align 4 +.LfoundNULL: +#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN__ + swape r4, r4 + swape r2, r2 + swape r3, r3 +#endif + ;; Find null byte + ffs r0, r4 + bmsk r2, r2, r0 + bmsk r3, r3, r0 + swape r2, r2 + swape r3, r3 + ;; make the return value + sub.f r0, r2, r3 + mov.hi r0, 1 + j_s.d [blink] + bset.lo r0, r0, 31 + + .align 4 +.Lcharloop: + ldb.ab r2, [r0, 1] + ldb.ab r3, [r1, 1] + nop + breq r2, 0, .Lcmpend + breq r2, r3, .Lcharloop + + .align 4 +.Lcmpend: + j_s.d [blink] + sub r0, r2, r3 +END_CFI(strcmp) |
