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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S | 86 |
1 files changed, 86 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S b/arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a913a7c84 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S + * Contributed by Richard Henderson (rth@tamu.edu) + * + * Append no more than COUNT characters from the null-terminated string SRC + * to the null-terminated string DST. Always null-terminate the new DST. + * + * This differs slightly from the semantics in libc in that we never write + * past count, whereas libc may write to count+1. This follows the generic + * implementation in lib/string.c and is, IMHO, more sensible. + */ +#include <linux/export.h> + .text + + .align 3 + .globl strncat + .ent strncat +strncat: + .frame $30, 0, $26 + .prologue 0 + + mov $16, $0 # set up return value + beq $18, $zerocount + + /* Find the end of the string. */ + + ldq_u $1, 0($16) # load first quadword ($16 may be misaligned) + lda $2, -1($31) + insqh $2, $16, $2 + andnot $16, 7, $16 + or $2, $1, $1 + cmpbge $31, $1, $2 # bits set iff byte == 0 + bne $2, $found + +$loop: ldq $1, 8($16) + addq $16, 8, $16 + cmpbge $31, $1, $2 + beq $2, $loop + +$found: negq $2, $3 # clear all but least set bit + and $2, $3, $2 + + and $2, 0xf0, $3 # binary search for that set bit + and $2, 0xcc, $4 + and $2, 0xaa, $5 + cmovne $3, 4, $3 + cmovne $4, 2, $4 + cmovne $5, 1, $5 + addq $3, $4, $3 + addq $16, $5, $16 + addq $16, $3, $16 + + /* Now do the append. */ + + bsr $23, __stxncpy + + /* Worry about the null termination. */ + + zapnot $1, $27, $2 # was last byte a null? + bne $2, 0f + ret + +0: cmplt $27, $24, $2 # did we fill the buffer completely? + or $2, $18, $2 + bne $2, 2f + + and $24, 0x80, $2 # no zero next byte + bne $2, 1f + + /* Here there are bytes left in the current word. Clear one. */ + addq $24, $24, $24 # end-of-count bit <<= 1 +2: zap $1, $24, $1 + stq_u $1, 0($16) + ret + +1: /* Here we must read the next DST word and clear the first byte. */ + ldq_u $1, 8($16) + zap $1, 1, $1 + stq_u $1, 8($16) + +$zerocount: + ret + + .end strncat + EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncat) |
