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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S')
-rw-r--r--arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S86
1 files changed, 86 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S b/arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a913a7c84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * arch/alpha/lib/strncat.S
+ * Contributed by Richard Henderson (rth@tamu.edu)
+ *
+ * Append no more than COUNT characters from the null-terminated string SRC
+ * to the null-terminated string DST. Always null-terminate the new DST.
+ *
+ * This differs slightly from the semantics in libc in that we never write
+ * past count, whereas libc may write to count+1. This follows the generic
+ * implementation in lib/string.c and is, IMHO, more sensible.
+ */
+#include <linux/export.h>
+ .text
+
+ .align 3
+ .globl strncat
+ .ent strncat
+strncat:
+ .frame $30, 0, $26
+ .prologue 0
+
+ mov $16, $0 # set up return value
+ beq $18, $zerocount
+
+ /* Find the end of the string. */
+
+ ldq_u $1, 0($16) # load first quadword ($16 may be misaligned)
+ lda $2, -1($31)
+ insqh $2, $16, $2
+ andnot $16, 7, $16
+ or $2, $1, $1
+ cmpbge $31, $1, $2 # bits set iff byte == 0
+ bne $2, $found
+
+$loop: ldq $1, 8($16)
+ addq $16, 8, $16
+ cmpbge $31, $1, $2
+ beq $2, $loop
+
+$found: negq $2, $3 # clear all but least set bit
+ and $2, $3, $2
+
+ and $2, 0xf0, $3 # binary search for that set bit
+ and $2, 0xcc, $4
+ and $2, 0xaa, $5
+ cmovne $3, 4, $3
+ cmovne $4, 2, $4
+ cmovne $5, 1, $5
+ addq $3, $4, $3
+ addq $16, $5, $16
+ addq $16, $3, $16
+
+ /* Now do the append. */
+
+ bsr $23, __stxncpy
+
+ /* Worry about the null termination. */
+
+ zapnot $1, $27, $2 # was last byte a null?
+ bne $2, 0f
+ ret
+
+0: cmplt $27, $24, $2 # did we fill the buffer completely?
+ or $2, $18, $2
+ bne $2, 2f
+
+ and $24, 0x80, $2 # no zero next byte
+ bne $2, 1f
+
+ /* Here there are bytes left in the current word. Clear one. */
+ addq $24, $24, $24 # end-of-count bit <<= 1
+2: zap $1, $24, $1
+ stq_u $1, 0($16)
+ ret
+
+1: /* Here we must read the next DST word and clear the first byte. */
+ ldq_u $1, 8($16)
+ zap $1, 1, $1
+ stq_u $1, 8($16)
+
+$zerocount:
+ ret
+
+ .end strncat
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncat)