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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/alpha/lib/strlen.S | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/alpha/lib/strlen.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/alpha/lib/strlen.S | 59 |
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/alpha/lib/strlen.S b/arch/alpha/lib/strlen.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4fc6a6ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/alpha/lib/strlen.S @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * strlen.S (c) 1995 David Mosberger (davidm@cs.arizona.edu) + * + * Finds length of a 0-terminated string. Optimized for the + * Alpha architecture: + * + * - memory accessed as aligned quadwords only + * - uses bcmpge to compare 8 bytes in parallel + * - does binary search to find 0 byte in last + * quadword (HAKMEM needed 12 instructions to + * do this instead of the 9 instructions that + * binary search needs). + */ +#include <linux/export.h> + .set noreorder + .set noat + + .align 3 + + .globl strlen + .ent strlen + +strlen: + ldq_u $1, 0($16) # load first quadword ($16 may be misaligned) + lda $2, -1($31) + insqh $2, $16, $2 + andnot $16, 7, $0 + or $2, $1, $1 + cmpbge $31, $1, $2 # $2 <- bitmask: bit i == 1 <==> i-th byte == 0 + bne $2, found + +loop: ldq $1, 8($0) + addq $0, 8, $0 # addr += 8 + nop # helps dual issue last two insns + cmpbge $31, $1, $2 + beq $2, loop + +found: blbs $2, done # make aligned case fast + negq $2, $3 + and $2, $3, $2 + + and $2, 0x0f, $1 + addq $0, 4, $3 + cmoveq $1, $3, $0 + + and $2, 0x33, $1 + addq $0, 2, $3 + cmoveq $1, $3, $0 + + and $2, 0x55, $1 + addq $0, 1, $3 + cmoveq $1, $3, $0 + +done: subq $0, $16, $0 + ret $31, ($26) + + .end strlen + EXPORT_SYMBOL(strlen) |
