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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/alpha/lib/strchr.S | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/alpha/lib/strchr.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/alpha/lib/strchr.S | 72 |
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/alpha/lib/strchr.S b/arch/alpha/lib/strchr.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..68c54ff50 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/alpha/lib/strchr.S @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * arch/alpha/lib/strchr.S + * Contributed by Richard Henderson (rth@tamu.edu) + * + * Return the address of a given character within a null-terminated + * string, or null if it is not found. + */ +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <asm/regdef.h> + + .set noreorder + .set noat + + .align 3 + .globl strchr + .ent strchr +strchr: + .frame sp, 0, ra + .prologue 0 + + zapnot a1, 1, a1 # e0 : zero extend the search character + ldq_u t0, 0(a0) # .. e1 : load first quadword + sll a1, 8, t5 # e0 : replicate the search character + andnot a0, 7, v0 # .. e1 : align our loop pointer + or t5, a1, a1 # e0 : + lda t4, -1 # .. e1 : build garbage mask + sll a1, 16, t5 # e0 : + cmpbge zero, t0, t2 # .. e1 : bits set iff byte == zero + mskqh t4, a0, t4 # e0 : + or t5, a1, a1 # .. e1 : + sll a1, 32, t5 # e0 : + cmpbge zero, t4, t4 # .. e1 : bits set iff byte is garbage + or t5, a1, a1 # e0 : + xor t0, a1, t1 # .. e1 : make bytes == c zero + cmpbge zero, t1, t3 # e0 : bits set iff byte == c + or t2, t3, t0 # e1 : bits set iff char match or zero match + andnot t0, t4, t0 # e0 : clear garbage bits + bne t0, $found # .. e1 (zdb) + +$loop: ldq t0, 8(v0) # e0 : + addq v0, 8, v0 # .. e1 : + nop # e0 : + xor t0, a1, t1 # .. e1 (ev5 data stall) + cmpbge zero, t0, t2 # e0 : bits set iff byte == 0 + cmpbge zero, t1, t3 # .. e1 : bits set iff byte == c + or t2, t3, t0 # e0 : + beq t0, $loop # .. e1 (zdb) + +$found: negq t0, t1 # e0 : clear all but least set bit + and t0, t1, t0 # e1 (stall) + + and t0, t3, t1 # e0 : bit set iff byte was the char + beq t1, $retnull # .. e1 (zdb) + + and t0, 0xf0, t2 # e0 : binary search for that set bit + and t0, 0xcc, t3 # .. e1 : + and t0, 0xaa, t4 # e0 : + cmovne t2, 4, t2 # .. e1 : + cmovne t3, 2, t3 # e0 : + cmovne t4, 1, t4 # .. e1 : + addq t2, t3, t2 # e0 : + addq v0, t4, v0 # .. e1 : + addq v0, t2, v0 # e0 : + ret # .. e1 : + +$retnull: + mov zero, v0 # e0 : + ret # .. e1 : + + .end strchr + EXPORT_SYMBOL(strchr) |
